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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis contains two essays. The first essay “Trade Can Remove 
Indeterminacy” is borne out of the fact that recent works on dynamic 
indeterminacy are largely based on the autarkic or the small-open economy 
framework. With this observation in mind, the essay is motivated by the following 
question: if indeterminacy exists in a country under autarky, can trade with 
another whose equilibrium path is unique result in uniqueness for all? To facilitate 
our analysis, I study a two-country dynamic trade model where prior to trade, 
indeterminacy exists in one country and saddle-path stability in the other. By 
introducing trade in final goods only, I find that saddle-path stability can prevail in 
both countries if the relative consumption of the “saddle-path” country is 
sufficiently large. I also show numerically that this sufficient condition for 
uniqueness can be very easily satisfied. Therefore, although indeterminacy may 
appear under theoretical and empirical examinations of autarkic or small open-
economy models, the steady states in actual fact could be saddle-path stable 
instead since trade takes place in most countries.  
 In the second essay “Indeterminacy, Stabilization Policy and Returns to Scale”, 
I examine the effectiveness of taxation as a stabilization tool in the Benhabib and 
Farmer (1996) two-sector model with increasing returns and the Benhabib and 
Nishimura (1998) two-sector model with social constant returns where 
consumption and investment goods are distinct. This study has previously been 
carried out using the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) one-sector model with 
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increasing returns by Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999). However, the one-
sector Benhabib-Farmer framework has since been criticized for requiring 
implausibly large returns to scale to generate indeterminacy. For the two-sector 
Benhabib-Farmer model, I find that labor income taxation schedules of both flat 
and progressive are highly effective and more effective than capital income 
taxation schedules in eliminating indeterminacy in the model. However, for the 
Benhabib-Nishimura model with social constant returns to scale, I find that both 
labor and capital income taxation schedules at all progressivity levels are 
ineffective in removing sunspot fluctuations. I argue that this difference occurs as 
a result of the distinct mechanism in generating indeterminacy in the two models. 
In the two-sector Benhabib-Farmer model, a convex social production possibility 
frontier, combined with the endogeneity in labor supply decision, is necessary for 
indeterminacy while the necessary condition for indeterminacy in the Benhabib-
Nishimura model is caused by private and social factor-intensity rankings that are 
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I. TECHNICAL REVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
 
1.1 Technical Overview 
Recent advances in modern macroeconomics based on dynamic general 
equilibrium theory emphasize the importance of indeterminacy in equilibrium 
paths in explaining economic fluctuations and cycles as well as heterogeneous 
growth experiences among countries with seemingly similar fundamentals. 
Although indeterminacy was once considered a weakness in theory that should be 
avoided with carefully imposed premises, it has since gained acceptance as a 
possible ramification of dynamic general equilibrium models. Starting from an 
influential work by Benhabib and Farmer (1994), which demonstrates the 
plausibility of indeterminacy in a one-sector model through calibration based on 
early estimates by Hall (1988, 1990) and Caballero and Lyons (1992), the 
literature now consists of a large body of research dealing with indeterminacy 
arising in multi-sector models (Benhabib and Nishimura, 1998; Benhabib, Meng, 
Nishimura, 2000), the small-open economy (Weder, 2001; Nishimura and 
Shimomura, 2002b) and the Heckscher-Ohlin framework (Nishimura and 
Shimomura, 2002a). 
 This chapter presents a brief technical overview of indeterminacy in growth 
models. The reader is invited to refer to Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for a more 
extensive treatment on this subject. The starting point is the representative agent, 
who is endowed with one unit of time, and maximizes lifetime utilities separable 
in consumption good and labor supply 
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−+ −                (1.1) 
As it is explained in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 below, the endogeneity in labor supply 
turns out to be a critical component for indeterminacy to take place. One 













  (Benhabib and Farmer, 1998) 
The parameter χ>0 is the inverse of the labor supply elasticity while 0≤γ<1 is the 
inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of consumption. When γ=1, 
the utility function becomes 1( , ) log /(1 )t t t tU C L C L χ χ+= − + . As Benhabib and 
Farmer (1994) assert, when the separability between consumption and leisure is 
combined with a Cobb-Douglas production function, the use of a logarithmic 
preference function over consumption is the only formulation of preferences 
consistent with stationary labor supply in a growing economy.  
 Another formulation, which is convenient for solving two-sector models with 
constant returns to scale, is 
EXAMPLE 2.  
1
11 1( , ) 1
1 1t t t t
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 (Meng and Velasco, 
2003) 
where the parameter σ>0 is the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution of consumption and χ>0 is the intertemporal elasticity of labor supply. 
One interesting outcome of this formulation is that the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and labor effort depends on the latter only 
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  ( , ) ( , )L t t C t t tU C L U C L Lχ− =  
and it is this result which enhances the tractability in solving a standard two-sector  
two-factor (or 2×2) model with endogenous labor supply.  
 Most of the frameworks in the literature can be distinguished by the 
assumptions made about the production side of the economy, and these engenders 
model that can be broadly classified in the following categories – 1) a one-sector 
economy with increasing returns to scale, 2) a two-sector economy with 
increasing returns to scale, and 3) a two-sector with constant social returns to scale. 
I now present a brief discussion on each of these cases. 
 
1.1.1 The One-Sector Framework with Increasing Returns 
In this model, production, as denoted by ( ), ; ,F K L K L , depends on the private 
amount of capital K and labor L, as well as the average economy-wide stock of 
capital K  and labor L . Except the inclusion of K  and L , the production function 
F is standard. It is assumed that 4:F →  is of class C2 and exhibits the 
following properties: i) ( ),  ; ,F K L   is increasing and concave; ii) ( ), ; ,F K L K Lλ λ  
( ), ; ,F K L K Lλ= , 0λ∀ > ; iii) ( )11 , ; , 0F L K L < for all , , 0L K L > ; iv) 
( )22 ,  ; , 0F K K L <   for all , , 0K K L > . The following example demonstrates one 
such functional form that satisfies these assumptions. 
EXAMPLE 3.  1 2a ba bY K L K Lθ θ=  (Benhabib and Farmer, 1994) 
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 The parameters 1θ  and 2θ  capture the factor specific externalities accruing to 
capital and labor. It is assumed that 1a b+ =  which implies that production 
exhibits constant returns to scale from the private perspective. However, since 
( )11aα θ= + , ( )21bβ θ= +  and 1α β+ > , returns to scale are increasing from 
the social perspective. Benhabib and Farmer (1994) have shown that the reduced-
form production specification of the final good producer in a monopolistically 
competitive economy can be represented by 1 2a ba bK L K LY θ θ= . 
In this a one-sector economy, the household maximizes (1.1) subject to  
  
.
K wL rK C Kδ= + − −                   (1.2) 
where δ  represents rate of capital depreciation. This dynamic problem of the 
agent gives rise to the following necessary conditions for optimality: 
  ( )'U C λ=                      (1.3) 
  ( ) ( )( ) ( )' , , ; , '1U C w K L K K L V Lλ = −               (1.4) 
  ( ), ; ,.K F K L K L C Kδ= − −                  (1.5) 
  ( ). / , ; ,r K L K Lρ δ λ λ+ = +                   (1.6) 
where variable λ  represents the shadow price of capital. The wage and rental rate, 
w and r, can be found by solving the firm’s profit maximization problem. In 
addition, using Equations (1.3) and (1.4), it is clear that L can be expressed as a 
function of K and λ. Equation (1.5) restates the capital accumulation equation 
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while Equation (1.6) equates the sum of the capital depreciation and the discount 
rates with the total return on the asset. 
 To see how indeterminacy can occur in this model, assume that the economy is 
already on an equilibrium path. Suppose now the agents believe there is an 
alternative equilibrium path by which the shadow price of capital λ is higher than 
its current value. If the returns to labor are high enough, for example, 1 0β − >  as 
in Benhabib and Farmer (1994), the wage will decline in the same direction as the 
labor supplied and hence in order for Equation (1.4) to hold, agents will have to 
raise their consumption of leisure. This action results in two opposing effects that 
give rise to indeterminacy. First, the increase in leisure causes the marginal 
product of capital, r, to fall. Consequently, the shadow price of capital must 
appreciate in order for intertemporal equilibrium to hold. However, the increase in 
leisure also reduces output and hence the future stock of capital. Benhabib and 
Farmer have shown that the necessary condition for indeterminacy can be 
represented in terms of the slopes of the labor demand and supply schedules, 
where the labor demand curve is upward sloping and cuts the labor supply curve 
from below. Therefore, the fall in output will shift the labor demand curve 
downwards and this will have an expansionary effect on the quantity of labor 
supplied. This expansionary effect, together with fall in future capital stock, 
implies that the marginal product of capital must eventually increase, which in 
turn requires the shadow price of capital to depreciate. It is this reversal in the 
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shadow price that allows the economy to return to the steady state along the new 
trajectory. 
 One of the most damaging criticisms of the one-sector framework is that the 
externalities necessary to generate indeterminacy are too large to be plausible. For 
example, through a calibration exercise, it is found that indeterminacy emerges in 
the Benhabib–Farmer framework when the ratios of β to b and α to a both equal 
1.5. These requirements are higher than recent estimates, where real business 
cycle theorists such as Basu and Fernald (1997) find that the returns-to-scale 
parameter in U.S. manufacturing is close to unity. Modifications however can be 
made to the one-sector framework to circumvent this problem. One of them is to 
consider preferences that are non-separable in consumption and leisure. By doing 
so, Bennett and Farmer (2000), demonstrate that the labor demand schedule can 
be downward sloping while equilibria may be indeterminate for returns-to-scale as 
low as 1.03.  
 The next alternative is to incorporate capital utilization into the standard real 
business cycle model. As Wen (1997) explains, capital utilization induces co-
movement between employment and consumption. As consumption increases, 
output will expand and the rate of capital accumulation will be raised. Eventually, 
marginal product of capital must diminish and growth in output and investment 
must fall. As the expansion reaches the upper limit, consumption will decline, 
reversing the initial economic expansion. Wen demonstrates that sunspot 
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propagating cycle of this sort only requires a degree of increasing returns-to-scale 
in the region of 1.1. 
   
1.1.2 The Two-Sector Framework with Increasing Returns 
Subsequent research on dynamic indeterminacy has been based on a two-sector 
framework with distinct consumption and investment goods. A popular 
formulation along this line uses sector-specific externalities to differentiate 
production technologies between the two sectors. At the same time however, the 
general characteristics of the production function here are similar to the ones 
specified in the one-sector framework. This can be seen more clearly through the 
following example: 
EXAMPLE 4.  a b a b a bC C C CC L K L K L K
θ θ σ γ
= ,  
a b a b a b
I I I II L K L K L K
θ θ σ γ
=  (Benhabib and 
Farmer, 1996) 
 The formulation above captures both sector-specific externalities and 
economy-wide externalities and the two-sector structure is preserved by the 
distinct sector-specific externalities arising from each sector’s own sectoral output. 
If the sector-specific externalities are absent, i.e. 0θ = ,  the model collapses to the 
one-sector Benhabib-Farmer framework. Note that the production specification 
implies that the production possibilities frontier (ppf) from the private perspective 
is linear and the ppf from the social perspective is convex to the origin. It turns out 
that the convex social ppf is necessary for indeterminacy to occur in the two-
sector model. To illustrate this, first maximize (1.1) subject to 
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  ( )1.K wL rK C K
p
δ= + − −                  (1.7) 
where p is the relative price of capital in terms of the consumption good. The 
factor returns w and r can be obtained from solving the firm’s profit maximization 
problem. The first order conditions then follow  
  ( )'pU C λ=                      (1.8) 
plus Equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6). The argument for indeterminacy begins by 
supposing that the economy is initially moving along an equilibrium path where 
there is now an increase in the shadow price of capital, λ. Benhabib and Farmer 
(1996) and (1999) assert that if the curvature of ( )U C  is not too severe, λ and p 
will change in the same direction. Since the social ppf is convex, the increase in p 
will raise the production of consumption goods relative to investment goods. 
Consequently, the labor supply curve shifts to the left, and since labor demand 
curve has the usual slope in the two-sector model, this will lead to a contraction in 
labor supplied. Marginal product of capital decreases as a result and the shadow 
price of capital has to appreciate in order to maintain the intertemporal 
equilibrium. However, like in the previous case, the contraction in labor also 
brings about a fall in investment and an eventual decline in capital stock. The 
marginal product of capital will subsequently rise and the shadow price of capital 
will depreciate. This reverses the initial process, where the economy returns to the 
steady state on an alternative equilibrium path. 
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 Although an elastic labor supply function plays an important role in the 
mechanism leading to indeterminacy, Weder (2001) finds that indeterminacy can 
also be obtained when labor is inelastically supplied if borrowing from a perfect 
world capital market is permitted. He argues that unlike the closed economy 
model, perfect capital markets allow the smoothing of consumption through 
international borrowing and lending and the world interest rate. Consequently, the 
curvature of the utility function becomes irrelevant, which makes it easier to 
construct alternative investment and hence equilibrium paths for the economy. 
  
1.1.3 The Two-Sector Framework with Social Constant Returns 
In Sections 1.1 and 1.2, indeterminacy requires a mechanism by which a rise or 
fall in the marginal product of capital would eventually reverse itself to maintain 
intertemporal equilibrium. However, in a model where production functions 
display constant returns to scale from the social perspective and decreasing returns 
to scale from the private perspective, indeterminacy now crucially depends on 
factor intensity reversal, which can be obtained if factor intensity rankings 
between social and the private perspective differ. To illustrate, consider the 
following production function. 
EXAMPLE 5. a b I II II I I II L K L K
α β
=  and a bC C C CC C C CC L K L K
α β
=    
 Suppose i i ia α θ+ =  and 1i i ib ß θ+ = −  where i=I,C, factor intensity reversal 
is possible if sgn( ) sgn( )I C C I C Ia b a b θ θ− ≠ − . To continue, we follow Benhabib 
and Farmer (1999) in assuming that utility function is linear in consumption. This 
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implies that '( ) 1U C =  and hence p λ= . As it will be shown in the following 
chapters, given production technologies that exhibit constant returns to scale, one 
can express ( , )I I Kλ= . Therefore, Equation (1.5) can be written as 
  ( , )
.
K I K Kλ δ= −                     (1.9) 
In addition, since factor prices can be represented as functions of p, Equation (1.6) 
can be expressed as 
  ( )( ). rλ ρ δ λ λ= + −                  (1.10) 
 Equations (1.9) and (1.10) fully describe the evolution of the system, whose 










=  ∂ 
−
 ∂ 
                 (1.11) 
In the steady state, we have /I Kδ =  and rρ δ+ = . Indeterminacy now depends 
on / /I K I K∂ ∂ −  and /r λ−∂ ∂  having the same sign, which can only occur when 
the reciprocal relation between the Rybzcinski and Stolper-Samuelson is broken. 
For example, suppose the investment good is labor intensive. The Stolper-
Samuelson theorem asserts that a rise in λ will decrease the rental rate of capital r. 





                    (1.12) 
 Next, the Rybzcinski theorem states that an increase in the capital stock K will 
decrease the output of the industry that employs it less intensively, in which case 
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is the investment good since it is labor intensive. If there is no factor intensity 
reversal, this condition can be represented by 





                   (1.13) 
 Since the determinant of the Jacobian matrix is negative, this establishes the 
fact that the equilibrium path is unique. However, as Benhabib and Nishimura 
(1998) have shown, when there are external effects, the relevant factor intensities 
and hence the sign of Equation (1.12) can be reversed. Given this situation, it is 
clear that the determinant is positive while the trace is negative, satisfying the 
necessary and sufficient condition for indeterminacy. In addition, although the 
one-sector model requires sufficiently large externalities for indeterminacy, 
Benhabib and Nishimura have demonstrated using this model that multiple 
indeterminate equilibria can arise even when the external effects are small.  
 
1.2 The Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of two self-contained essays. The first essay, presented in 
chapter 2, is motivated by the observation that almost all studies in the literature to 
date are based on the closed or the small–open economy. Trade has largely been 
ignored, with the exception of Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) who examine a 
two-country Heckscher-Ohlin variant of Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) with 
inelastic labor supply. However, as it will be shown in the first essay, the autarkic 
economies in Nishimura and Shimomura, which differ only in terms of relative 
factor endowments, themselves exhibit indeterminacy. Since factor prices can be 
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expressed solely in terms of output prices in a standard H-O framework and the 
integrated economy can be used to represent the world consisting of these 
countries that trade with each other, it is no surprise that the H-O model exhibits 
indeterminacy as well. Herein lies a question of what will happen to the dynamics 
of the world equilibrium path if one country whose steady state is a sink (i.e. 
indeterminate equilibrium paths) trades with another whose steady state is saddle-
path stable. Using the Benhabib and Nishumura (1998) production setup, Chapter 
2, entitled “Trade Can Remove Indeterminacy”, demonstrates that such 
configuration is enough to remove indeterminacy. Therefore, one potential 
problem highlighted by the chapter is that although the closed or small–open 
economies may exhibit indeterminacy from the theoretical point of view, the 
dynamics actually experienced by countries could be saddle-path stable since most 
countries do trade in reality. 
 Chapter 2 also presents a first study related to the interaction between two 
systems with distinct economic dynamics. This is important because a system that 
displays indeterminacy when taken in isolation may in fact exhibit saddle-path 
stability when it interacts with another system. This is true for the case where 
trade provides a linkage between two countries which have distinct stability 
properties. Therefore, the results obtained in Chapter 2 motivate a future research 
agenda of studying economics dynamics in the presence of heterogeneous 
consumers, firms and countries. 
 Chapter 3, entitled “Indeterminacy, Stabilization Policy and Returns to Scale” 
studies the role of the government in eliminating indeterminacy and preventing 
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the onset of sunspot related fluctuations. The closest antecedents to this chapter 
are Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999), whose analysis are based on the 
one-sector Benhabib and Farmer (1994) model with increasing returns to scale. 
The deficiency in their work therefore lies in the fact that the one-sector model has 
been widely-criticized for needing implausibly large amount of externalities to 
generate indeterminacy and that reasonable frameworks exhibiting indeterminacy 
are either modeled with two or more sectors or with social returns to scale that are 
constant.  
 To fill in the gap in the literature, Chapter 3 analyzes the effectiveness of 
taxation as a stabilization mechanism in the Benhabib and Farmer (1996) two-
sector model with increasing returns and the Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) two-
sector model with social constant returns where consumption and investment 
goods are distinct. For the two-sector Benhabib-Farmer model with increasing 
returns to scale, labor income taxation schedules of both flat and progressive are 
highly effective, and more effective  than capital income taxation schedules in 
eliminating indeterminacy. The intuition for this result parallels the explanation 
given in Section 1.2 above, where the opposite forces on the marginal product of 
capital stemming from the contraction or expansion of labor supply are crucial for 
constructing an alternative equilibrium path. As Chapter 3 shows, capital taxation 
dampens both the opposite forces, making indeterminacy possible. However, with 
labor income taxation alone, capital accumulation is the only dynamic process that 
is dampened, with intertemporal arbitrage condition left untouched. As a result, 
the marginal product of capital does not rise or diminish enough to reverse its 
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initial decline or increase necessary for the construction of an alternative 
equilibrium path. 
 For the Benhabib-Nishimura model with social constant returns to scale, both 
labor and capital income taxation schedules at all progressivity levels are 
ineffective in removing sunspot fluctuations. The reason for this is related to the 
mechanism leading to indeterminacy in this model. Unlike the Benhabib-Farmer 
framework where endogenous labor supply decision is important to generate 
indeterminacy, indeterminacy arises here because factor intensity rankings from 
the private and social perspectives are the opposite of the other Therefore, as long 
as the factor intensity reversal remains, indeterminacy can occur despite 
implementing the taxation schemes. This is an important result since models with 
social constant returns are believed to reflect the empirical facts more closely than 
models with increasing returns and consequently, the effectiveness of taxation as a 
stabilization policy asserted by Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999) could 
most likely be overemphasized. 
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II.   TRADE CAN REMOVE INDETERMINACY 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Recent macroeconomics literature has witnessed a growing interest in dynamic 
models that may feature indeterminacy, or a continuum of equilibrium paths 
converging to a steady state. In particular, one major strand of research in this area 
is the focus on production externalities as contributing factor to indeterminacy.1 
Among the most influential works, Benhabib and Farmer (1994) demonstrate that 
indeterminacy can arise in a one-sector real business cycle model with sufficiently 
large increasing returns to scale generated by externalities. Through subsequent 
research, Benhabib and Farmer (1996) and Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) also 
show that the size of externalities required for indeterminacy diminishes 
considerably by introducing two or more sectors in the economy respectively. 
Seen in this light, these studies suggest that the indeterminacy is plausible since 
the requirements for it to occur are consistent with the U.S. empirical estimates 
highlighting small market imperfections and roughly constant returns to scale in 
production (Burnside (1996); Basu and Fernald (1997)). 
 The one and two-sector Benhabib-Farmer framework has since stimulated 
various research along similar lines. For example, based on Benhabib and Farmer 
(1996), Harrison and Weder (2001) and Harrision (2001) investigate the types of 
externalities needed for indeterminacy in a model with aggregate and sector-
                                                 
1
 Other cause of indeterminacy include government distortions (see Raurich (2001), Schmitt-Grohè and Uribè 
(1997)) and monopolistic competition (see Gali (1996)) 
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specific externalities. Weder also studies a small open-economy version of the 
two-sector Benhabib-Farmer model and showed that indeterminacy is much more 
easily attainable when foreign borrowing is permitted. And finally, Guo and 
Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999) introduce taxation into the Benhabib and Farmer 
(1994) and find that a progressive labor tax schedule can stabilize the economy 
against sunspot fluctuations. 
 Despite these recent advances, most works in the literature till date are largely 
based on the autarkic or the small open-economy model, with exception to 
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) who examine the existence of indeterminacy 
using a two-country Heckscher-Ohlin model with production externalities. Since 
much has yet to be done on whether trade can play a role in influencing the 
dynamic behavior of individual economies, our objective therefore is to fill in this 
gap. The motivation of this chapter can be understood through the following 
inquiry: if a country’s steady state is indeterminate (i.e. a sink) under autarky, can 
trade with another whose steady state is saddle-path stable result in saddle-path 
stability for all countries? Alternatively put, can the saddle-path from one country 
restrict the otherwise indeterminate path in another when both countries trade? By 
using a simple two-country model where indeterminacy exists in one country and 
saddle-path stability in another under autarky, I find that the answer is generally 
yes. Via trade linkages alone, saddle-path stability can occur in both countries if 
the relative consumption of the “saddle-path” economy is above a certain critical 
point which is very easily met.  
 17 
 This conclusion challenges the theoretical support for indeterminacy stemming 
from the analysis of closed or small open-economy models. Even though 
indeterminacy may exist in these models, this chapter argues that saddle-path 
stability is the most likely outcome in reality since countries do trade. Moreover, 
our finding also questions the empirical strategy widely used to demonstrate the 
plausibility of indeterminacy. Through the calibration of closed economies, it is 
claimed that the estimated economic parameters fall within the parameter space 
required for indeterminacy.2  However, if trade with “saddle-path” countries is 
enough to remove the sunspot equilibria previously present in autarky, then 
evidences obtained from these calibration exercises should be treated with some 
degree of caution at best. 
 The organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 2.2, I will first 
analyze the dynamic property of an autarkic model where production functions are 
constant returns to scale from the social perspective and decreasing returns to 
scale from the private perspective. I find that the restrictions by which 
indeterminacy exists exactly coincide with the ones given by Nishimura and 
Shimomura. Although not mentioned by them, I rationalize that indeterminacy 
exists in their two-country H-O model because each country’s growth path is 
already indeterminate prior to trade. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
uncertainties are present in the long-run prediction of trade patterns when the 
countries trade. In addition, I also observe that the existence of indeterminacy 
under both autarky and trade can be linked to the instability of the consumption 
                                                 
2
 See Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Benhabib and Nishimura (1998). 
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market equilibrium since the necessary and sufficient condition for indeterminacy 
requires intersecting a negatively sloping consumption supply function with its 
demand curve from above. And finally, I will show that saddle-path stability is the 
only outcome in the absence of production externalities. 
  Using the results derived in Section 2.2, Section 2.3 examines a two-country 
model, with production externalities present in one country and absent in the other. 
Factors of production are internationally immobile and all characteristics of the 
autarkic countries in Section 2.2 are retained in order for us to examine the role of 
trade in influencing the model’s dynamic behavior. Firstly, I find that saddle-path 
stability will hold in this two-country model as long as each country’s autarkic 
steady state is saddle-path stable. Secondly, I derive a computable sufficient 
condition for uniqueness to hold in both countries under the restrictions by which 
prior to trade, indeterminacy exists in one country and saddle-path stability in the 
other. I will also show numerically that this sufficient condition can be very easily 
satisfied. Section 2.4 concludes. 
 
2.2 The Autarkic Economies 
2.2.1 An Autarkic Model with Sector-Specific Externalities3 
The economy is populated by an infinitely-lived representative agent having an 
instantaneous utility given by   










                                                 
3
 Detailed derivations in sections 2 and 3 are available upon request. 
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where C is consumption and 1/ (1, )η ∈ ∞ is the intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution in consumption. Labor is assumed to be supplied inelastically. In a 
two-sector economy where consumption goods, C, and investment goods, I,are 















                        (2.1) 
with respect to 1K , 2K , 1L  and 2L  and subject to the following constraints 
  
a b I II I
I I I II L K L K
α β
=  and a bC C C CC C C CC L K L K
α β
=              (2.2) 
  I CK K K= +  and I CL L L= +                 (2.3)
  
.
K I Kδ= −                        (2.4) 
with (0, )ρ ∈ ∞  as the subjective rate of time discount rate and K0 as the initial 
stock of capital taken as given. Equation (2.2) describes the production 
technologies in the economy, which are based on Benhabib and Nishimura (1998). 
The size of labor and capital externalities in sector i = I, C are measured by i and 
i respectively and the externalities associated with labor and capital input are 
represented by iL  and iK . In addition, it is assumed that the technology in both 
sectors exhibits constant returns to scale from the social perspective, i.e. 
1i i i ia b ßα+ + + = , but decreasing returns to scale from the private perspective, 
i.e. 1i ia b+ < . Equation (2.3) describes the market clearing constraints for capital 
and labor that are perfectly mobile across sectors. Equation (2.4) describes a 
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standard neoclassical equation of capital accumulation where (0,1)δ ∈  is the 
capital depreciation allowance. 
 The current value Hamiltonian can be written as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( , ) ln
     
a ba b I I C CC CI I
I I C CI I I C C C
I C I C
K C I K P L K L K I P L K L K C
r K K K w L L L
α β α βλ λ δΗ = + − + − + −
+ − − + − −
 
where IP , CP , r  and w  are the Lagrange multipliers representing the shadow 
price of investment good, consumption good, capital and labor respectively. In 
addition, the costate variable λ captures the shadow price of investment. By 
normalizing all the prices in terms of IP  , i.e. setting C Ip P P= , Ir r P=  and 
Iw w P= , the necessary conditions for optimality are  
  C pη λ− =                      (2.5) 
  
11 a ba b I I C C C CI I
I I I I I C C C C Cw a L K L K pa L K L K
α β α β−−
= =           (2.6) 
  
11 a ba b I I C C C CI I
I I I I I C C C C Cr b L K L K pb L K L K
α β α β−−
= =                (2.7) 
  ( ). rλ λ ρ δ= + −                    (2.8) 
  lim ( ) ( ) 0
t
tK t t e ρλ
→∞
−
=                    (2.9) 
 Equation (2.5) expresses the equality between marginal utility and marginal 
cost of consumption while (2.8) represents the intertemporal arbitrage condition. 
Equation (2.6) states the equalization of the marginal revenue product of labor 
across sectors and (2.7) states the equalization of the marginal revenue product of 
capital across sectors. Note that in Chapter 3, these similar conditions are obtained 
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from solving the producers’ problem in a decentralized economy framework. 
Finally, the transversality condition is given by (2.9).  
  Equations (2.6) and (2.7) consist of four equations with four unknowns, LI, LC, 
KI, and KC. These can be implicitly solved in terms of w and r, which in turn are 
implicit functions of p.4  In addition, a useful relationship between total income 
from the private and the social perspectives can be expressed as 
 wL + rK + Π = WILI + RIKI  + WCLC + RCKC (= I + pC)         (2.10) 
where Π is the firm’s profit due to private decreasing returns to scale, Wi and Ri 
are the social wage and rental income in sector i respectively. By capitalizing on 
the social constant returns to scale property in production functions, we can 
express Li and Ki as functions of Wi and Ri and hence to obtain social cost 
functions that are homogenous of degree one in output. To derive these cost 
functions, which are crucial for the ensuing analysis, we first obtain Wi and Ri by 
setting iiL L= , iiK K= , i i ia α θ+ =  and 1i i ib ß θ+ = −  in (2.2) and observing the 
fact that 
1 1i i
i i i i iW p L K
θ θθ − −=                     (2.11) 
(1 ) i ii i i i iR p L K
θ θθ −= −                          (2.12) 
where i = I,C, and 1pi =  for i = I and p pi =  for i = C. Since Wi and Ri are not 
the actual factor income received, they do not equalize across sectors. Equations 
(2.11) and (2.12) can be equivalently represented by 
  i i i iW l p θ=                       (2.13) 
                                                 
4
 For a general analysis of a two-sector model, refer to Uzawa (1963). 
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( )1i i i iR k p θ= −                      (2.14) 
where C Cl L C≡ , I Il L I≡  are the unit labor requirement and C Ck K C≡  and 
I Ik K I≡  are the unit capital requirement in the consumption and investment 
good sector respectively.  
Using (2.13) and (2.14), the two social zero profit conditions for the 
investment and consumption good sectors are 
 1 I I I IW l R k= +                         (2.15) 
  C C C Cp W l R k= +                   (2.16) 
where due to social constant returns to scale, the unit input requirements are 
functions of iW  and iR  alone.  
Equations (2.11) and (2.12) can be combined with (2.6) and (2.7) to yield two 














=                        (2.18) 
By using (2.17) and (2.18) in (2.15) and (2.16), and log-differentiating the social 
zero profit functions with respect to p, two expressions describing the Stolper-























               (2.20) 
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where θC – θI is a measure of factor intensity rankings from the social perspective. 
For example, if labor is more intensively used in the consumption good sector 
from the social perspective, then θC – θI > 0. In our model, it turns out that the 
Stolper-Samuelson conditions, which also represent the price elasticities of wage 
and rental rates, are the same even when production externalities are absent. 
 Differentiating the social cost functions with respect to factor prices and 
applying the envelope theorem, one can derive the factor clearing conditions as  
I C
I C
l l I L
k k C K
    






The system of equations in (2.21) contains two unknowns I and C, which can be 
solved using (2.13), (2.14), (2.17) and (2.18) to obtain   
C Cb wL a rKI −=
∆
                   (2.22) 
 





                 (2.23) 
where ∆= aI bC – aC bI measures the factor intensity rankings from the private 
perspective. For example, if aI>aC, i.e. labor is more intensively used in the 
investment sector than in the consumption sector from the private perspective, and 
if bC>bI, i.e. capital is more intensively used in the consumption sector from the 
private perspective, we have ∆>0. 
 In equilibrium, the clearing of the consumption good market can be expressed 
by equating the consumption demanded from (2.5) with the quantity supplied from 
(2.23): 
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                 (2.24) 
By Walras Law, the market clearing conditions (2.21) and (2.24) imply that the 
investment goods market must also clear.  And using (2.22), the dynamic budget 
constraint (2.4) can be rewritten as 
( ) ( ). C Cb w p L a r p KK Kδ−= −
∆
                     (2.25) 
Finally, since the rental rate r is a function of the relative price of consumption, 
equation (2.8) can written as 
( )( ). r pλ λ ρ δ= + −                     (2.26) 
 The evolution of the economy is governed by two first-order differential 
equations given by (2.25) and (2.26) and the steady state is defined as a vector 
( ),e eK λ  that solves 0.K =  and 0.λ = , where eK is the steady state equilibrium 
stock of capital and eλ is the steady state co-state variable. It is assumed that 
growth is degenerate and hence ( ) 0r pρ δ+ − =  is satisfied for (2.26) in the long 
run. Based on this condition, the steady state relative price of consumption, pe, is 
uniquely determined from ( )er p ρ δ= + , which in turn solves 
( , , , , , , , )e e eI C I CK K a a b b L pρ δ≡  and ( , , , , , )e e eI C I Ca a b b L pλ λ≡ . Before 




λ  are functions of p, which is a one-
to-one correspondence of K and λ. These implicit relationships are expressed by 
totally differentiating the clearing condition (2.24) to obtain: 
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1/
1 ( )( )Ia pdp
dK
ηρ δ λΣ +
= −
∆




= −                       (2.28) 
where 
1
( ) (1 )( (1 ))1 1
( ) ( (1 ))
C I C I C C I C C I
I C I
a b b a a b a b
b
θ ρ δ θ ρ δ δ
η θ θ ρ δ
+ + − + + −
= +
Σ − ∆ + −
.  
By approximating the model’s behavior by linearization, one can obtain the 








   	





                  (2.29) 
where K  and λ  represent deviations of K and λ from the steady state. To 
ascertain the local dynamic property of the economy,  the determinant and trace of 
the Jacobian matrix, denoted by 1J , are found to be 5 
  
1(1 ) ( )( 1) ( )
C I C C I I
I C
a a b a b
Det J
ρ δ δ θ ρ δ
η θ θ
 + + − Σ + 
= −  	 	∆ −
 
 




(1 )( )( )( 1) ( )
IC I C C II
I C
a a b a ba pTrace J
η θ ρ δρ δ δρ δ λ
η θ θ
Σ ++ + −ΦΣ +
= − − +
∆ −∆
 
                          (2.31) 
The stability property of the steady state can be examined under two separate 
cases. 
Case 1  Factor intensity rankings of labor and capital are the same in both sectors  
from the private and social perspectives. 
                                                 
5
 All expressions of the Jacobian matrices are relegated to Appendix A1. 
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 Consider I Cθ θ− <0 and ∆<0. These restrictions imply that 11/ 0Σ >  and hence 
( 1) 0Det J < , which implies that there is one eigenvalue with negative real part and 
one with positive real part. Therefore, the path of convergence is spanned by a one 
dimensional stable manifold. Since the co-state variable is the only non-
predetermined variable, there is only one choice of 0λ  given 0K  such that the 
equilibrium path converges to the steady state. 
 
Case 2  Factor intensity rankings of labor and capital are different in both sectors 
from the private and social perspectives. 
 Consider I Cθ θ− <0 and ∆>0. Whether ( 1)Det J  is positive depends on the sign 
of Σ1. If η ∈ ( ) ( (1 ))0, ( ) (1 )( (1 ))
C I I
C I C I C C I C C I
b
a b b a a b a b
θ θ ρ δ
θ ρ δ θ ρ δ δ
 
− ∆ + −
 	
+ + − + + −
 
 is chosen however, 
then Σ1>0 and hence ( 1) 0Det J > . This is the necessary condition for 
indeterminacy since a positive determinant is enough to rule out saddle-path 
stability. Furthermore, since ( 1) 0Det J >  and ( 1) 0Trace J < , we know that both 
eigenvalues have negative real parts and hence the convergence path is spanned 
by a two-dimensional stable manifold. Therefore, any choice of 0λ  given 0K will 
ensure that the equilibrium path converges to the steady state. 
 Indeterminacy arises in this economy when two conditions are met, i) 
I Cθ θ− <0 and ∆>0 and ii) 11/ >0Σ . Although it is difficult to rationalize these 
conditions intuitively, some observations relating to the static market equilibrium 
of consumption goods can be made. If condition i) is satisfied, the output supply 
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function of consumption good is negatively sloping. This can be seen by 
differentiating (2.23) to obtain 
  2
'( ) '( ) '( ) '( )I I I I I Ia r p K b w p L a rK b wL a r p K b w p LdC C
dp p p pp
− − −
= − = −
∆ ∆∆
 
Given ∆>0 and I Cθ θ− <0, /dC dp is negative since r'(p)<0 and w'(p)>0 and hence 
0C L∂ ∂ < , which in turn indicate that dual relationship between the Stolper-
Samuelson and Rybczynski effects is broken. This is also the cause of 
indeterminacy in Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) and Mino (2001) where the 
same production setup is used. With a negatively sloping supply curve therefore, 
the static market equilibrium for consumption good is unstable if the demand 
curve cuts it from above. This situation can be rationalized from condition ii), 
which states that η must be small enough so that 11/ >0Σ . Equivalently, for a 
sufficiently small η close to 0 by which the second condition for indeterminacy is 
met, the slope of the demand curve, 
  





= −  
will be steeper than the output supply curve. 
 Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) have demonstrated that the two-country 
dynamic H-O model can exhibit indeterminacy upon introduction of sector-
specific externalities. Note that our two-sector model is an autarkic variant of 
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a), since the same utility and production 
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functions are used. Therefore, given that indeterminacy occurs in both models 
under the same set of restrictions6, we argue that: 
REMARK 2.1 For a 2×2×2 model with identical production functions and tastes 
across countries, the stability property of the world economy’s steady state is 
characterized by the stability property common in both countries prior to trade. 
 For a two-country version of this autarkic economy, Remark 1 states that the 
stability property of world economy is dependent on each country’s stability 
property prior to trade. Therefore, other than consumption market equilibrium 
instability, indeterminacy exists in the Nishimura–Shimomura framework because 
each country’s convergence path is already indeterminate before trade. Remark 1 
is intuitive given the fact that a two-country world economy with identical 
preference and constant returns to scale production functions behaves like an 
integrated equilibrium under incomplete specialization. Since the only difference 
across countries is factor proportions and since prices are unaffected by 
endowments under incomplete specialization, the integrated world must exhibit a 
dynamic behavior similar to the autarkic economy.  
 
 
2.2.2. An Autarkic Model without Sector-Specific Externalities  
Retaining all other aspects in the model formulated above, the production function 
where externalities are absent takes on the form 
                                                 
6




i i iY L K
θ θ−
=                          (2.32) 
The two first-order differential equations governing the evolution of this autarkic 
economy are 
  
(1 ) ( ) ( ). C C
I C







            (2.33) 
  [ ]( ). r pλ λ ρ δ= + −                  (2.34) 
and the partial effects of K and λ on p are 
  
1
















= −                    (2.36) 
where 2
2
(1 ) ( ( ) (1 ))1 1
( )
C C I C I C I
I C
ρθ θ δθ θ θ θ θ
η ρ θ θ




 is positive . After 
approximating (2.33) and (2.34) around the steady state, the determinant of the 















              (2.37) 
Since it is clear that 2 0Σ < , one has ( 2) 0Det J <  for all factor intensity rankings. 
Therefore, there is only one eigenvalue with a negative real part, which implies 
that the steady state is saddle-path stable. 
 Before proceeding to the next section, it is useful to summarize in Table 2.1 
the key results presented in this section. Under Restriction 2, I will later examine 
whether indeterminacy can exist in a two-country world economy when none of 
 30 
the country’s steady state is indeterminate under autarky. Following that, under 
Restriction 3, I will examine the world’s steady state property when one “saddle-
path” country trade enters into trade with another whose steady state is 
“indeterminate”. Also, since any changes in the partial effects affects the 
evolution of the capital stocks and the co-state variables, all the partial effects 
under Restrictions 2 and 3 will be preserved in the next section so that the 
behavior of the dynamic equations for each country remains despite moving from 
autarky to trade. By doing so, one can isolate the role of trade in influencing the 
equilibrium dynamics in a two-country world economy. The only change that 




I Cθ θ− <0 and ∆<0 
Restriction 2 
I Cθ θ− <0, ∆>0, Σ<0 
Restriction 3 

























<   
0dp
dλ <  0
dp
dλ <  0
dp
dλ <  0
dp
dλ >  0
dp
dλ <  0
dp












Table 2.1: A Summary of Key Results  
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2.3 A Two-Country Model with Distinct Production Functions 
In this section, I examine the dynamic behavior of a two-country world economy 
where cross-country production functions are distinct due to the presence of 
externalities. We allow trade of final goods to take place between a country where 
production externalities are present and another where externalities are absent. It 
should be noted that the presence or absence of externalities is a purely 
hypothetical issue. By this abstraction, this section purports to examine whether 
indeterminacy can occur if trade takes place between countries in which 
technology are dissimilar from each other due to the presence of externalities.  
Two crucial findings emerge in the ensuing study. Firstly, even if production 
functions are distinct across countries, if saddle-path stability occurs in each 
country under autarky, it will be preserved when the countries trade. But more 
importantly, if indeterminacy exists in one country and saddle-path stability in 
another, the world’s equilibrium path will be indeterminate in the absence of trade. 
However, it becomes determinate if relative consumption by the “saddle-path” 
country exceeds a certain critical value above which the sufficient condition for 
determinacy is met.  
 
2.3.1 Producers     
The economy with production externalities, called the home country, is endowed 
with internationally immobile capital stock K and labor force L. Only free trade of 
consumption and investment goods takes place and the relative price of 
consumption p is equalized across countries. Solving (2.6) and (2.7) and given 
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that production functions are constant returns to scale from the social perspective, 
the factor prices w and r can be implicitly expressed in terms of the underlying 
parameters and p.  
  ( )w w p≡                         (2.38) 
  ( )r r p≡                        (2.39) 
Since p is determined from the trade balance conditions involving consumption 
and investment goods, w and r can be solved using (2.38) and (2.39).  
 Next, the country where production externalities are absent, called the foreign 
country, is endowed with K* and L so that the size of the labor force is the same in 
both countries.7 The wage w* and rental rate r* in the foreign country can be 
implicitly derived as 
  * *( )w w p≡                      (2.40) 
  * *( )r r p≡                       (2.41) 
The price elasticities of wage and rental income in the foreign country, 




1'( ) '( )
( ) ( )
I
C I
pw p pw p









r'( ) r '( )
( ) ( )
I
I C
p p p p






together with the fact that * ( ) ( )r p r p>  and *( ) ( )w p w p> , the Stolper-
Samuelson effect is less pronounced in the home country than it is in the foreign 
country. This is so since profits accruing in the home country partially absorb the 
impact of price changes and hence dampen the price effects on private returns. 
                                                 
7
 The foreign country’s parameters and variables are distinguished by (*) whenever it is applicable. 
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2.3.2 Consumers    
The same preference function describes the behavior of the representative 
consumer in both countries. It is assumed that the rate of capital depreciation and 
the subjective rate of time preference differs across countries, i.e. *δ δ≠ for 
[ ]*, 0,1δ δ ∈ , and *ρ ρ≠  for ( )*, 0,ρ ρ ∈ ∞ . The evolution of both co-state 
variables is given by 
( )( ). r pλ λ ρ δ= + −                  (2.42) 
( )* * * * *( ). r pλ λ ρ δ= + −                   (2.43) 
Using (2.10), (2.22) and (2.23), the capital stock in the home country grows 
according to 
( ) ( )( ) ( ). C CI I b w p L a r p Ka r p K b w p LK pC Kδ−−= + − −
∆ ∆
     (2.44) 
Similarly, the capital accumulation in the foreign country follows the process 
* * * * *( ) ( )
.
K w p L r p K pC Kδ= + − −             (2.45) 
since I + pC = * * *w L r K+  
 
2.3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics    
Because utility functions are identical across the countries, the trade balance for 
consumption good can be expressed as     
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( ) ( )
* * *
1/ 1/ (1 )
* ( )
I I I I
I C
a rK b wL r K w Lp p
p p






       (2.46) 
The evolution of the two-country world is governed by four first-order differential 
equations described by (2.42), (2.43), (2.44) and (2.45). For tractability sake, the 
following Lemma is useful for reducing the system by one dimension:  
LEMMA 2.1  There is a constant ξ >1, determined from *0 0r rξ= , that solves 
*
t tr rξ=  for all [ )0,t ∈ ∞ . 
Proof. See Appendix A2.  
 Using Lemma 2.1 and the following assumption, we can then reduce the 
system by one dimension. 
ASSUMPTION 2.1 
* *ρ δ ρ δξ
+
= + .  
 Note that Assumption 2.1 holds throughout time since ξ becomes a constant 
once it is determined at t=0. Given this assumption, one has 
LEMMA 2.2 Under Lemma 2.1 and Assumption 2.1, the relationship *t tm ξλ λ=  
holds for all [ )0,t ∈ ∞ . 
Proof. Using Lemma 2.1, we can rewrite (2.43) as ( )* * * */ / ( ).t t r pλ λ ξ ρ δ ξ = + − . 








λ λξ λλ =  
which is integrated to obtain *t tm ξλ λ= , where m is a constant.  
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Using Lemma 2.2, the model’s behavior can then be summarized by a three-
dimensional system  
  
1/ ( 1) /( ) ( )( ) ( ). C CI I b w p L a r p Ka r p K b w p LK p Kη η ηλ δ− −−−= + − −
∆ ∆
   (2.47) 
  
* * * * 1/ ( 1) / *( ) ( ) ( )
.
K w p L r p K m p Kξ η η ηλ δ− −= + − −          (2.48) 
  [ ]( ). r pλ λ ρ δ= + −                  (2.49) 
Once again, degenerate growth is guaranteed by assuming that ( ) 0er pρ δ+ − =  
holds in (2.49). After totally differentiating the consumption clearing condition 
(2.46), the partial effects of K, *K  and λ on p are 
  
( )










 ∆ + 	

 
             (2.50) 
  
( )







dK p m p
ηη ξ
θ ρ δ







            (2.51) 
  
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1/1/
1/1/
p p m pdp
















           (2.52) 
where   
( ) ( )
* *
1/1/3
*'( ) (1 ) '( ) '( ) '( )
( )1 1 1
I I I I
I C
















 Our intermediate goal is verify that under Restrictions 2 and 3 in Table 2.1, the 
signs of the above partial effects remain the same when compared to the case 
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where trade is absent. As mentioned earlier, a change in these signs will alter the 
dynamic behavior of Kt, Kt *  and λt and possibly affect the effects of trade on the 
steady state properties of the world economy. Now, under Restriction 2, it is clear 
that 31/ 0Σ >  and hence / 0dp dK > , */ 0dp dK >  and / 0dp dλ < , and these 
correspond to the partial effects where both countries’ steady states are saddle-
path stable under autarky. Under Restriction 3, the sign of 31/ Σ becomes 
ambiguous. However, since η can be chosen such that 31/ Σ  is positive, we can 
still obtain / 0dp dK < , */ 0dp dK > and / 0dp dλ < . These partial effects 
correspond to indeterminacy existing in the home country and saddle-path 
stability in the foreign country under autarky. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
moving from autarky to trade, the signs of / 0dp dK > , */ 0dp dK >  and 
/ 0dp dλ <  will remain unchanged under Restrictions 2 and 3. 
 Using (2.50), (2.51), (2.52) and the expression for 31/ Σ , the linearization of 
(2.47), (2.48) and (2.49) yields Jacobian matrix J3. The next assumption will 
allow us to proceed with greater analytical convenience: 
ASSUMPTION 2.2 ( ) ( ) * 0
e
I Ca a r p δ ρ− − ∆ = >
∆
 
Although Assumption 2.2 is restrictive, we shall see that it is reasonable given 
plausible benchmark values used in the end of this section. With Assumption 2.2, 




'( )( 3) * ( ) ( )pr p dp dp dpDet J p m p
p d dK dK




= − + + 	

 
   (2.53) 
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Therefore, using the above expression, the following proposition can be stated as: 
PROPOSITION 2.1 Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, if ∆<0 and 1 2θ θ− <0, the 
equilibrium path ( )*, ,t t tK K λ uniquely converges from the initial values  
( )*0 0 0, ,K K λ  to the steady state ( )*, ,e e eK K λ . 
Proof.  A simple analysis of the model’s behavior can be carried out by 
straightforward application of the Routh theorem, which states that the number of 
changes in signs in the following scheme 
-1        + ( 3)Trace J       ( 3)( 3)
Det JF
Trace J
− +        + ( 3)Det J  
indicates the number of eigenvalues with positive real parts. F is the sum of the 
minor matrices 11 22 21 12c c c c−  , 11 33 31 13c c c c−  , 22 33 23 32c c c c−  of the Jacobian matrix. 
Since ∆<0 and I Cθ θ− <0, we know that Σ >0 and hence both /dp dK  and 
*/dp dK are positive and /dp dλ  is negative. In addition I Cθ θ− <0 implies that 
'( )r p <0 and therefore it is clear that ( 3)Det J <0. Since ( 3)Trace J  contains both 
positive and negative terms, we now consider two cases: 
Case 1     ( 3)Trace J >0 
The signs must change twice only and hence there are two eigenvalues with 
positive real parts and one with negative real part. Since λ is the only non-
predetermined variable, the steady state is saddle-path stable.  
Case 2     ( 3)Trace J <0 
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Appendix A3 demonstrates that F− + ( 3)( 3)
Det J
Trace J
  is always positive if ( 3)Trace J <0. 
Once again, the signs must change twice and therefore the equilibrium is saddle-
path stable. 
Therefore, whichever the sign of ( 3)Trace J  is, the steady state is always saddle-
path stable.  
Referring to Table 2.1, if there is no difference in the factor intensity rankings 
from the private and social perspectives, i.e. ∆<0 and I Cθ θ− <0, the steady state 
is saddle-path stable in both countries under autarky. Given these, Proposition 1.1 
states that saddle-path stability will be preserved in the world economy whenever 
the steady states in both countries are also saddle-path stable in autarky. 
In the absence of trade, if ∆>0, I Cθ θ− <0 and 31/ 0Σ > , equilibrium path in 
this two-country world will be indeterminate since indeterminacy exists in the 
home country. However, when trade takes place, it turns out that the world’s 
equilibrium path becomes unique if the size of relative foreign consumption 
satisfies the weakest sufficient condition, defined as having the least computable 
lower bound. This sufficient condition will ensure ( 3) 0Det J < , by which the 
Routh Theorem implies that the economy exhibits indeterminacy or saddle-path 
stability. 
To further elaborate, we define a computable lower bound as the lower bound 
that can be explicitly expressed in terms of the model’s exogenously given 
parameters. A least computable lower bound is therefore the least of all other 
computable lower bounds above which the sufficient condition for saddle-path 
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stability is met. It turns out that this sufficient condition requires some variable to 
fall within the interval (X, ∞), where X is a term containing some exogenous 
parameters. But another interval (Y, ∞) with Y greater than X is also an interval 
for sufficiency. If there is no lower bound Y such that i) Y is less than X, ii) Y 
contains exogenous terms only and iii) (Y, ∞) is the interval for sufficiency, then 
X is the least computable lower bound and hence (X, ∞) is the weakest sufficient 
condition with a computable lower bound. The next proposition states this 
sufficient condition: 
PROPOSITION 2.2 Under Assumptions 2.1 and 2.2, if ∆>0, I Cθ θ− <0 and 3Σ >0, 
the equilibrium path  ( )*, ,t t tK K λ  uniquely converges from the initial values 
( )*0 0 0, ,K K λ to the steady state ( )*, ,e e eK K λ  if the condition 






ρ δ ρ θ θ
θ ρ δ





Proof. If ∆>0, 1 2θ θ− <0 and Σ >0, then */dp dK is positive and both /dp dK and 
/dp dλ are negative. Clearly, as long as ( 3) 0Det J < , we have 
* 1/ 1/
*
( ) ( )dp dp dpp m p
p d dK dK
η ξ ηληρ λ ξ λλ
− −
 
− + + 	

 
>0. If ( )Trace J >0, the steady state is 
saddle-path stable. If not, saddle-path stability occurs if and only if 
F− + ( 3)( 3)
Det J
Trace J
>0. As Appendix A4 demonstrates, this is satisfied as long as 
* 1/ 1/
*
( ) ( )dp dp dpp m p
p d dK dK
η ξ ηληρ λ ξ λλ
− −
 
− + + 	

 
>0. Using (2.41), (2.42), (2.43), the 
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expressions ( ) 1/C p ηλ −= ,  ( ) 1/*C m p ηξλ −=  and the steady state rental income 
( )er p and * ( )er p , this condition is equivalent to  
( )* *






ρ δ ρ θ θ
ξ ρ θ δ θ




            (2.54) 
It can be easily verified that the above sufficient condition contains the largest 
interval satisfying ( 3) 0Det J < , by which saddle-path stability is guaranteed in the 
world economy. Hence, the expression (2.54) defines the weakest sufficient 
condition with ( 3) 0Det J < .  
If ∆>0, I Cθ θ− <0 and 3Σ >0, indeterminacy is guaranteed in the home country 
while saddle-path stability in the other when trade is absent. Now interestingly, by 
adding trade in final goods only, saddle-path stability will be ensured in the home 
country whenever (2.54) is satisfied. This result has non-trivial implications on 
past research in the literature since macroeconomic models displaying 
indeterminacy are usually set up using the autarkic or small open-economy 
framework.8  Hence, even though these models can demonstrate indeterminacy 
both theoretically and empirically, I have shown that the actual stability property 
could be saddle-path stable instead. Therefore, if we examine an economy from 
the autarkic perspective such as the one discussed in Section 2.2, we might be led 
to believe that indeterminacy exists even though the actual convergence path is 
unique when trade is taken into consideration. 
                                                 
8
 Analyses based on the small open-economy include Weder (2001) and Nishimura and Shimomura (2002b). 
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Subject to the availability of parameter estimates, the computability of the 
sufficient condition provides an avenue of assessing the plausibility of 
indeterminacy. Note also that the sufficient condition reveals that differences in 
factor intensity rankings between the private and social perspectives are necessary 
for indeterminacy. For example, we know if the consumption good sector is more 
labor intensive from both the social ( I Cθ θ− >0) and the private perspectives (∆= 
aI bC –aC bI <0) and the inverse is true for the investment good sector, then the 
model’s behavior only exhibits saddle-path stability and not indeterminacy. 
Therefore, revisiting Proposition 2.2, we can immediately conclude that the steady 
state is saddle-path stable since the sufficient condition is automatically satisfied.  
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) have shown using a numerical example 
that a small amount of externalities is enough for generating indeterminacy. 
Through a counter-example, I now demonstrate how easy it is to satisfy the 
sufficient condition for uniqueness when the size of externalities is small 9 . 
Consider the benchmark model 
aI = 0.3,   αI = 0.0001,   bI = 0.68,   βI = 0.0199 
aC = 0.29,  αC = 0.0111,   bC = 0.6989,  βC = 0   
Since θI = 0.3001 and θC = 0.3011, we have I Cθ θ−  = 0.001. Note that this social 
labor intensity difference is used by Nishimura and Shimomura. From the above 
specification, we have ∆ = 0.0095. In addition, by setting ρ = 0.05 and δ = 0.05, 
the foreign discount rate calculated from Assumption 2.2 is found to be ρ* = 
                                                 
9
 Recent empirical findings such as Burnside (1996) and Basu and Fernald (1997) have shown that returns to scale 
are roughly constant and externalities are minimal. 
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0.0302 (rounded to 4.s.f). Finally, the lower bound of the sufficient condition will 
be larger when ξ is closer to one. Hence, we set ξ=1 so that if the relative foreign 
consumption satisfies the sufficient condition for this value, it will also satisfy the 
sufficient condition for any ξ >1. Given these benchmark values, the sufficient 
condition will be met if * /C C > 0.0985 (4 s.f). Therefore, it is highly plausible for 
saddle-path stability to prevail in the country whose equilibrium path is 
indeterminate when viewed from the autarkic perspective. 
 Next, increase the size of externalities while retaining the same factor intensity 
ranking differences from the private and social perspectives. Consider  
aI = 0.2,   αI = 0.1001,   bI = 0.58,   βI = 0.1199 
aC = 0.19,  αC = 0.1111,   bC = 0.5989,  βC = 0.1 
The sufficient condition for uniqueness becomes * /C C > 0.0648 (4 s.f) and once 




In this chapter, I have examined the equilibrium dynamics of two autarkic 
economies where production externalities are present in one of them and absent in 
the other. For the former, I have shown that indeterminacy can occur under certain 
parameter restrictions while saddle-path stability is the only outcome for the latter 
country. The first contribution of the chapter relates to the key finding of 
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002a) that indeterminacy can exist in a two-country 
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H-O model upon introduction of sector-specific externalities. However, I have 
demonstrated that the H-O formulation does not in itself bring about 
indeterminacy when production externalities are present. Instead, indeterminacy 
occurs in their model because each country’s equilibrium path is already 
indeterminate prior to trade. In addition, I have provided the observation for 
indeterminacy in terms of the static consumption market instability. 
 Maintaining the same partial effects of K, *K and λ on p and the parameter 
restrictions as in Section 2.2, trade in final goods is now allowed to take place. At 
first glance, it may seem that trade in final goods will not affect the equilibrium 
dynamics of the autarkic economies. For example, the world evolution path in the 
absence of trade is characterized by the dynamic equations (2.25), (2.26), (2.33), 
and (2.34), and the goods market clearing condition of the respective countries. In 
this case, under Restriction 3, indeterminacy occurs in the world economy since 
there are three eigenvalues with negative real parts and one with positive real 
parts. Note that even if we reduce the dimension by one, just as in Section 2.3, the 
indeterminacy result will not be affected since there will be two eigenvalues with 
negative real parts while there is only one non-predetermined variable in the 
reduced system. 
 When trade takes place, the world evolution path will similarly be governed by 
the individual countries dynamic equations except for one change – where instead 
of having two clearing conditions each for consumption and investment goods, we 
now have a single clearing condition for each good, as represented by the trade 
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balance equation. However, altering the goods market clearing condition has non-
trivial impact on the equilibrium dynamics, and as we have already seen, trade 
with “saddle-path” economies may easily remove indeterminacy.  
In this respect, the second contribution of the chapter asserts that empirical 
evidences supporting indeterminacy based on the calibration of closed economies 
should be treated with some degree of caution. To do so, the chapter presents a 
computable sufficient condition for uniqueness to hold in a two-country model 
where indeterminacy occurs in one country under autarky and saddle-path stability 
in another. The likelihood of saddle-path stability under trade challenges the 
supporting evidence for indeterminacy obtained from calibrating closed economy 
models. Furthermore, even if the sufficient condition is not met, indeterminacy 
occurs in both two-country and autarkic models only if the consumption supply 
function is downward sloping. This negatively sloping supply function may seem 
counterfactual to actual evidence and widely accepted microeconomic behavior of 
producers. Therefore, it is possible that previous studies have overstated the 
plausibility of indeterminacy actually experienced by the countries under scrutiny. 
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 The possibility of sunspots and the indeterminacy of equilibrium path arising 
in dynamic economies have been investigated extensively in recent years. Starting 
from Benhabib and Farmer (1994) who have shown that indeterminacy can arise 
in a one-sector real business cycle model with increasing returns to scale, the 
coverage of recent literature now includes investigating the existence of 
indeterminacy in models with two or more sectors (Benhabib and Nishimura 1998; 
Harrison 2001; Harrision and Weder 2001), and examining the theoretical 
plausibility of indeterminacy in the light of capital utilization (Wen 1998) and cost 
of adjustment (Kim 2002; Herrendorf and Valentinyi 2002).  
This paper explores the effectiveness of taxation as a stabilization tool based 
on two-sector models distinguished by the following production specifications: 1) 
increasing returns to scale (IRS) from the social perspective and constant returns 
to scale (CRS) from the private perspective, and 2) CRS from the social 
perspective and decreasing returns to scale (DRS) from the private perspective.  
By a stabilized economy, the literature refers to it as one whose equilibrium path 
is unique and not indeterminate. The closest antecedents to this chapter are Guo 
and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999), who show that through implementing 
progressive taxation, the government can stabilize the one-sector Benhabib and 
Farmer (1994) economy. Their conclusion however is not free from theoretical 
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disputes since the Benhabib-Farmer framework has been widely criticized on 
empirical grounds for requiring large increasing returns to scale to generate 
indeterminacy.10 Importantly as well, subsequent research has since begun to work 
with private CRS technology that exhibits mild externalities (Benhabib and 
Farmer, 1996). Moreover recently, in line with the real business cycle facts, 
greater emphasis has been placed on modeling based on CRS technologies 
(Benhabib, Meng, and Nishimura 2001; Mino 2001; Nishimura and Shimomura 
2002). 
In this respect, the argument of Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999) alone 
cannot be deemed conclusive on whether taxation is effective for preventing 
sunspot fluctuations. What can provide a more cogent analysis instead is a study 
using models with the two aforementioned production specifications. The 
organization of the chapter is as follows. In Section 3.2, I examine the 
effectiveness of labor and capital income taxation scheme in stabilizing an 
economy whose production functions belong to the first specification. Our 
findings in this section can be summarized as the following: first, both labor 
income and capital income taxes, even though the tax schedules are flat, are 
effective; second, taxation would be even more effective if they exhibit increasing 
progressivity; third, at each average tax rate, labor income tax is more effective 
than capital income tax.  
                                                 
10
 Estimates have shown that the returns to scale are roughly constant and market imperfections are 
small (see Burnside 1996; Basu and Fernald 1997, among others). 
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In Section 3.3, the study focuses on a model with the second production 
specification. Contrary to Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999), I find that tax 
policies at all degrees of progressivity are ineffective. Hence, this chapter presents 
new theoretical evidence to show that the effectiveness of taxation is sensitive to 
scale returns in social technology, where taxation is effective when returns to 
scale are increasing but ineffective when returns to scale are constant. Section 3.4 
concludes. 
 
3.2 A Model with Private Constant Returns to Scale Technology 
3.2.1 The Producer’s Problem 
 The competitive economy of Benhabib and Farmer (1996) is outlined as 
follows. There are two distinct commodities, an investment good, I, and a 
consumption good, C, that are produced using capital and labor as inputs. K and L 
are the economy-wide stock of capital and labor, where the fractions Lµ  of L and 
Kµ of K are employed in the consumption goods industry. The production 
technologies of both sectors are given by 
  ( ) ( )a bL KC A L Kµ µ=                   (3.1) 
  ( )( ) ( )( )1 1a bL KI B L Kµ µ= − −                (3.2) 
where 1a b+ = . Although technologies are identical across sectors, the scaling 
factors A and B are distinct and dependent on both sector-specific and economy-
wide externalities generated by capital and labor input: 
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  ( ) ( )a b a bL KA L K L Kθ θ σ γµ µ=                (3.3) 
  ( )( ) ( )( )1 1a b a bL KB L K L Kθ θ σ γµ µ= − −              (3.4) 
where ( )1aα θ γ= + + , ( )1bβ θ σ= + +  and 1α β+ > . The parameter θ  
represents the size of the sector-specific externalities, and σ and γ represent the 
size of economy-wide externalities accruing to labor and capital input respectively. 
One advantage of using this setup is that the fractions can easily be shown as 
K Lµ µ µ= = , which implies that each sector uses both factors in the same 
proportion. Furthermore, this two-sector model is a more general representation of 
previous studies based on the one-sector real business cycle framework, as the 
model collapses to a one-sector Benhabib and Farmer (1994) variant when 0θ = . 
 Define the production possibilities frontier (ppf) as 
  ( )/ a bI B A C I pC BL K Y+ = + = ≡                (3.5) 
As it can be seen, the relative price of consumption p is the ratio of the scaling 
factors. Since the ppf from the private perspective exhibits constant returns to 
scale, we have 
  
a bBL K wL rK= +                    (3.6) 
where the wage and rental rates are 1a bw aBL K−= and 1a br bBL K −=  respectively. 
In contrast, the ppf from the social perspective ( )1a bY BL K L Kθ α βµ≡ = − , which 
is obtained by setting  L L= , K K=  and µ µ=  in (3.5), exhibits increasing 
returns to scale. 
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3.2.2 The Government 
Following Guo and Lansing (1998), the labor and capital tax schedules, τL and τK, 







τ ψ  = −  	

 







τ ψ  = −  	

 
                   (3.8) 
where wL  and rK , taken as given by the household, represent the economy’s 
average wage and rental income. The parameters (0,1]mψ ∈  and [0,1)mφ ∈  
measure the level and the slope of the tax schedule for factor m=K,L. The 
marginal tax rate on factor m’s income, say mY , defined as the change in the 
income taxes paid by factor m divided by the change in its taxable income, is 
higher than the average tax rate when 0mφ > , i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( )/ 1 1 / mm m m m m m m mY Y Y Y φτ φ ψ τ∂ ∂ = − − >  when 0mφ > . In this case, it is clear that 
the income tax schedule exhibits progressivity. If 0mφ = , the marginal and 
average tax rates on factor m are equal, i.e. ( ) /m m m mY Yτ τ∂ ∂ = , and hence the tax 
schedule is flat. Finally, the tax schedule is regressive if 0mφ < . 
 Unlike Devereux, Head, Lapham (1996) and Guo (2003), who explored the 
macroeconomics effects of temporary and permanent changes in government 
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spending in real business cycle models, we simply assume that government budget 
deficit clears instantaneously 
  L KG wL rKτ τ= +                         (3.9) 
where G is the government expenditure and L KwL rKτ τ+  is the tax revenue. As a 
point of deviation, it would be interesting to study how persistence in government 
spending can impact the equilibrium dynamics of the economy. If the 
government’s expenditure increases overtime, so must the level of taxation too. 
This may mimic the degree of progressivity of taxation without imposing the 
above functional forms of government taxation. In addition, there is much room to 
explore how government’s expenditure may distort consumption-leisure decision 
leading to a change in the economy’s equilibrium dynamics. For example, as 
demonstrated by Fernandez, Novales, Ruiz (2003), indeterminacy can be very 
easily generated in a model without externalities if public expenditure enters into 
the utility function as a multiplicative factor of leisure. 
 
3.2.3 The Household Problem 
The household’s expenditure is allocated between three components – 
consumption goods, gross investment and taxes – which are funded out of wage 
and rental income 
  C pI G wL rK+ + = +                         (3.10) 
The gross investment I comprises net investment 
.
K  and depreciation investment 




I K Kδ= +                     (3.11) 
Using Equations (3.7) and (3.8), the household’s budget constraint can then be 
written as 
  ( ) ( )( )1 1. L KK wL rK pC Kτ τ δ= − + − − −             (3.12) 
 Subject to (3.12), the representative household maximizes discounted stream 


















                  (3.13) 
The parameter [ )0,ρ ∈ ∞  represents the subject rate of time discount 
and [ )0,χ ∈ ∞  denotes the inverse of the labor supply elasticity. The current-
valued Hamiltonian is 
  ( ) ( )( )1( , ) ln 1 11 L K





Η Λ = − + Λ − + − − −
+
   




= Λ                     (3.14) 
  ( )( ) 11 / L a bL LL wL wL aBL Kφχ ψ φ −= Λ −              (3.15) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 1. L KL KL KK wL wL rK rK pC Kφ φφ φψ ψ δ− −= + − −         (3.16) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 /. K a bK K rK rK bBL Kφρ δ φ ψ −Λ = Λ + − Λ −          (3.17) 
  lim 0t
te Kρ−→∞ Λ =               (3.18) 
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Equations (3.14) to (3.18) completely described the solutions to the intertemporal 
optimization problem. 
 
3.2.4 Equilibrium Dynamics and Analysis 
Although each household in isolation acts and takes the other households’ 
decisions as given, in symmetric equilibrium, we have L L= , K K=  and µ µ= . 




=                        (3.19) 
equations (3.16), and (3.17) can be written as11 
  
( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1
1
. L KL L K K
L K
L KwL a S rK b SK
K KK K




− − − −
− −
= + − −
ΛΛ Λ
      (3.20) 
  
( ) ( ) 1 1
1
1. K K K
K











           (3.21) 
 The derivation is further simplified by transforming the variables into 
logarithmic forms. By letting logλ = Λ , logk K=  and logs S= , an equivalent 
representation of (3.20) and (3.21) can be expressed as 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1 1












φ φ φ φ λ
φ φ φ φ λ λ
ψ
ψ δ
− − − − −





             (3.22) 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 111. K K KK s kK K b erK φ φ φ λφλ ρ δ φ ψ − − − −−= + − −         (3.23) 
                                                 
11
 See Appendix B1 for derivations of (3.20) and (3.21). 
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In the steady state, the conditions /wL wL aS= = Λ  and /rK rK bS= = Λ  hold and 
hence the following expressions can be obtained 











                (3.24) 
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       (3.25) 
In addition, since s is a function of k and λ, we have12 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( )
*
* 1 1 1 1L K L K K K
S
S a b a b b
ρ δ




− + + − + − −
    (3.28) 
where *S  represents the steady state level of S. Linearizing the system of 
equations and using Equations (3.24) to (3.27), the determinant and the trace of 
the Jacobian matrix evaluated at the steady state are found to be 
  
( )
( ) ( )( )
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     (3.29) 
                                                 
12
 See Appendix B2 for derivations of (3.26) and (3.27). 
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( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 1 1 1s k kLK L k K k K
K




ψψ φ φ φ
ψ
− − − −
 




 The trace of the Jacobian is the sum of the roots and the determinant is the 
product of the roots of the system of equations (3.22) and (3.23). Since λ  is the 
only non-predetermined variable, indeterminacy requires that both roots evaluated 
at the steady state are negative. Equivalently, this implies that the determinant of 
the Jacobian should be positive and its trace should be negative. Observing the 
determinant, let us suppose that 0L Kφ φ− ≤ . With ( )( )1 1 0Lβ χ αφ− + − <  and 
0L Kφ φ− ≤ , a positive determinant will necessarily require that sλ  is negative, 
otherwise with a positive sλ , saddle-path stability is immediately established. 
Notice that sλ  changes sign in a manner of passing from plus infinity to negative 
infinity as the size of sector-specific externalities θ increases from zero. 
Additionally, although not clearly observable from (3.30), it can be easily verified 
that the trace also changes sign in the same direction as sλ . For example, if we set 
1Lψ = , 1Kψ = , 0Kφ = , and, 0Kφ =  the model collapses to Benhabib and Farmer 
(1996) where the trace is given by 
  





= − + 	+
 
             (3.31) 
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Hence, when sλ  passes from plus to minus infinity, so too will the trace of the 
Jacobian matrix. In this respect, given mild externalities, not only is 0sλ <  the 
necessary condition but also the sufficient condition for indeterminacy13. 
 The remainder of the section consists of several numerical experiments carried 
out using a benchmark economy proposed by Benhabib and Farmer (1996) in their 
calibration exercise. The benchmark values are shown in Table 3.1.  
Parameter a b ρ δ σ γ 
Calibrated Value 0.7 0.3 0.05 0.1 0 0 
 
Table 3.1: Benchmark Values Proposed by Benhabib and Farmer (1996) 
 
Figure 3.1: Calibration using 1Lψ = , 1Kψ = , 0Lφ = , 0Kφ =  
 
                                                 
13
 As shown in Figure 1, if the size of externalities is large enough, it is possible for an unstable 
















 As a starting point, Figure 1 demonstrates the region of indeterminacy in the 
absence of taxes. In the region below the solid curve, the determinant of the 
Jacobian is positive while the trace is negative in the region above the dotted 
curve. Hence, the region of indeterminacy is the region below the solid curve, 
above the dotted curve and the area satisfying 0χ ≥ . Note that the trace can cross 
from the negative to the positive region while determinant remains positive and 
thus we cannot invoke the Bendixon negative criterion to rule out a non-attracting 
limit cycle.14 With mild externalities however, explosive dynamics are unlikely to 
occur since regions of indeterminacy or saddle-path stability clearly dominate. 
Figure 3.2: Calibration using 0.8L Kψ ψ= = , 0L Kφ φ= =  
                                                 
14
 In a one-sector Benhabib and Farmer (1994) framework however, limit cycles can be ruled out by 
















 By introducing a flat tax schedule on both wage and capital income of 20 
percent, i.e. 0.8L Kψ ψ= = , it can be seen from Figure 3.2, the region of 
indeterminacy has greatly diminished. This is an interesting result, keeping in 
mind of Guo and Lansing’s (1998) and Guo’s (1999) assertion that the 
effectiveness of taxation is associated with the reduction of the steepness of the 
upward sloping labor demand curve necessary for indeterminacy. In this two-
sector model, I have shown that even if the labor demand curve has the usual 
slope, taxation can still be an effective tool for stabilizing the economy. In 
addition, the analysis here contrasts Guo and Lansing’s (1998) proposition that 
only tax schedules with a progressivity feature can be effective. Based on a two-
sector model, which distinguishes itself from the one-sector framework only 
because sector-specific externalities are present, I have shown that the 
progressivity of taxation is not necessary and a flat tax schedule alone suffices for 




Figure 3.3: Calibration using 0.8L Kψ ψ= = , 0.2L Kφ φ= =  
 Retaining the above average tax rates and adding a progressivity feature to 
both labor and capital tax schedules, i.e. 0.2L Kφ φ= = , Figure 3.3 shows that 
indeterminacy will most likely be eliminated for plausible values of θ and χ with 
the mildly progressive tax schemes in place. 15 For example, given 0.8L Kψ ψ= = , 
0.2L Kφ φ= = , a value of χ = 0.25 proposed by Benhabib and Farmer (1994) 
requires the size of sector-specific externalities to exceed 0.2211 for 
indeterminacy to occur. This value however, is well above several notable 
estimates found in real business cycle studies such as Basu and Fernald (1997), 
                                                 
15 In fact, although not demonstrated here, there region of indeterminacy in Figure 3.3 is further 
















who show that returns to scale are roughly constant and the largest returns in 
aggregate output is 1.03 at best. Even after accounting for the usage of 
intermediate goods, Morrison (1990) produces an estimate of 1.13, which is also 
insufficient for indeterminacy to take place in this economy given the 
progressivity specified in this example. 
Comparing between a flat labor and capital income tax schedule next, Figures 
3.4 and 3.5 below show that although both schemes can reduce the region of 
indeterminacy, tax on labor income is clearly more effective than tax on capital 
income. An alternative comparison presented in Figure 3.6, which is drawn in the 
K Lψ ψ−  space, reveals that average capital income tax rates at all levels are 
ineffective when the average labor income tax rate is zero. In contrast, in the 
absence of capital income tax, an average labor income tax rate of approximately 
26%, i.e. 0.74Lψ = , is enough to stabilize the economy against sunspot 
fluctuations. Despite the lack of effectiveness of capital income tax, we can see 
from Figure 3.6 that it has a complementary relationship with labor income tax, in 
the sense that the average labor income tax rate required for determinacy is 
smaller given a larger average capital income tax rate. Moreover, based on the 
calibrated values, capital income tax can be effective if labor income tax is 
employed simultaneously.  
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Figure 3.4: Calibration using 0.8Lψ = , 1Kψ = , 0L Kφ φ= =  
 































Figure 3.6: Calibration using 0L Kφ φ= = , 0.25χ = , 0.2θ =  
 The rationale behind why labor income tax is more effective can be broadly 
understood as follows. To understand how indeterminacy arises in the first place, 
consider an economy moving along an equilibrium trajectory. An increase in the 
relative price of consumption, p, will lower the production of consumption goods 
and raise investment since the social ppf is convex. In addition, Equation (15) 
suggests that when consumption decreases, the labor supply schedule will shift to 
the right. Given a downward sloping labor demand schedule, the outcome is an 
expansion of labor supply and hence investment. 
 Suppose indeterminacy takes place initially in the absence of taxes and the 
shadow price moves in opposite direction to the relative price of consumption. 
There are now two opposing effects on the marginal product of capital (MPK) that 















allow another equilibrium trajectory to be constructed. First, any increases in labor 
supply will raise the MPK and for intertemporal equilibrium to hold, the shadow 
price Λ  must depreciate. This can be easily seen from (3.17), where given a fixed 
discount and depreciation factor, an increase in  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 11 KK a bK K rK bBL K Kφφφ ψ − −− Λ   must be accompanied by a decrease in 
Λ  of equivalent size. This decline further reinforces the initial rise p and 
consequently investment itself. However, the expansion in investment will 
eventually lower the MPK and hence intertemporal equilibrium requires Λ  to 
appreciate. If Λ  appreciates enough to offset the initial decline, the economy will 
return to the steady state, resulting in another equilibrium trajectory. 
 Now introduce a flat labor tax schedule, which only enters into the capital 
accumulation equation. If indeterminacy occurs initially, then Λ  must have 
appreciated sufficiently (due to the expansion of investment) to reverse its initial 
depreciation (due to the expansion of labor supply). However, with labor income 
tax, capital may not accumulate enough to cause an adequate decline in MPK 
necessary for the economy to return to the steady state. In this respect, there is a 
overall intertemporal decline in Λ , which in turn provides the impetus for p to rise 
even more in future. Upon repeating the above argument, it is clear that path of p 
is explosive and will eventually violate the transversality condition. Therefore, an 
alternative equilibrium trajectory cannot be constructed and indeterminacy is ruled 
out. 
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 Since taxation on capital income enters both (3.16) and (3.17), it will be less 
effective than taxation on labor income in eliminating indeterminacy. Suppose 
only capital income tax is used. Starting from a rise in p and hence labor supply, 
(3.17) shows that the after-tax MPK will increase by less than the amount had 
labor income tax been adopted instead. As a result, to maintain intertemporal 
equilibrium, Λ  needs to depreciate by less than what is required when labor 
income tax is in place. Consequently, even if the capital income tax dampens the 
capital accumulation process and the corresponding decline in MPK, Λ  does not 
need to increase much for indeterminacy to occur since the initial depreciation in 
Λ  is smaller with the capital income tax in place. In this respect, a capital tax 
schedule would be not as effective as a labor tax schedule for stabilizing the 
economy against indeterminacy-driven fluctuations.  
 
3.3  A Model with Social Constant Returns to Scale Technology 
3.3.1 The Producers’ Problem  
 This section presents a decentralized version of the autarkic economy in 
Chapter 2, where firms produce an investment good and a pure consumption good 
using a constant and inelastically supplied labor force and a reproducible stock of 
capital. Firm i=1,2 maximizes profits subject to 
  
a b i ii i
i ii i iY L K L K
α β
=   for i = 1,2                       (3.32) 
where good 1 is the capital good, taken to be the numeraire, and good 2 is the 
consumption good with price p. As in the previous chapter, it is assumed that the 
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size of labor and capital externalities in sector i are measured by i and i  and the 
externalities associated with labor and capital input are represented by iL  and iK . 
In addition, the Cobb-Douglas technologies exhibit constant returns to scale from 
the social perspective with 1i i i ia b ßα+ + + =  but decreasing returns to scale from 
the private perspective so that 1i ia b+ < . The firm’s profit maximization problem 
yields wage, w , and rental income, r, as  
1 11 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 21 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
a b a b
w a L K L K pa L K L K
α β α β− −
= =              (3.33) 
  
1 11 1 2 21 1 2 2
1 21 1 1 1 2 2 2 2
a b a b
r b L K L K pb L K L Kα β α β− −= =             (3.34) 
For exposition sake, we employ a useful relationship linking total income from the 
private and social perspectives  
wL + rK + Π = W1L1 + R1K1  + W2L2 + R2K2 (= I + pC)            (3.35) 
where Π is profits due to private decreasing returns to scale. The social wage and 
rental income in sector i, Wi and Ri, can be obtained from setting iiL L=  and 
iiK K=  in (3.32) and solving the social profit maximization problem. The first 
order conditions are  
1 1i i
i i i i iW p L K
θ θθ − −=                        (3.36) 
(1 ) i ii i i i iR p L K
θ θθ −= −                      (3.37) 
where 11 =p  and pp =2 . Using (3.36) and (3.37), two social zero profit 
conditions for the investment and consumption good sectors are derived as 
( )1 1 11 ,c W R=                     (3.38) 
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  ( )2 2 2,p c W R=                   (3.39) 
where ( ), ( ) /i i i i i i i ic W R W L R K Y≡ +  is the social unit cost function for sector i, and 














=                         (3.41) 
Substituting (3.40) and (3.41) in (3.38) and (3.39) and log-differentiating the 























                  (3.43) 
where θ2 – θ1 is a factor intensity ranking difference between goods from the 







c c Y L
Y Kc c
    




                (3.44) 
where /i indc dn c=  is the unit factor requirement of labor (if n=W) or capital (if 
n=R) in sector i, results in   
2 2b wL a rKI −=
∆
                    (3.45) 
  





                  (3.46) 
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where ∆= a1b2 – a2b1 is the factor intensity difference between goods from the 
private perspective.  
 
3.3.2 The Household Problem  
 The representative household faces the following dynamic budget constraint 
  
.
C K K G wL rKδ+ + + = + + Π                (3.47) 
where C is the size of consumption, G is the government expenditure and 
(0,1)δ ∈  is the capital depreciation allowance. As before, the government’s 
budget constraint clears instantaneously. In addition, profits enter into the budget 
constraint due to decreasing returns to scale. Using (3.7), (3.8) and (3.9), Equation 
(3.47) can be written as  
(1 ) (1 )
.
L KC K K wL rKδ τ τ+ + = − + − + Π             (3.48) 
Subject to (3.48), the infinitely-lived household with perfect foresight maximizes 














                    (3.49) 
where 1/ (1, )η ∈ ∞ is the elasticity of substitution and (0, )ρ ∈ ∞  is the subjective 
discount rate. The necessary conditions for optimality are the following first order 
conditions 
C pη λ− =                      (3.50) 
1(1 ) ( )
.
K K K
K K rK r K
φ φ φλ ρ δ φ ψλ
− −
= + − −             (3.51) 
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(1 ) (1 )
.
L KC K K wL rKδ τ τ+ + = − + − + Π                (3.52) 
and the transversality condition 
  lim ( ) ( ) 0
t
tK t t e ρλ −
→∞
=                     (3.53) 
The clearing condition of the consumption good market can be obtained by 
equating the consumption demanded equation (3.50) with the quantity supplied 
equation (3.46): 




                    (3.54) 
The market clearing conditions described by (3.44) and (3.46) imply that the 
investment good market must also clear. Using the income relationships (3.35), 
the tax expressions (3.7) and (3.8), and the consumption clearing condition (3.54), 
the dynamic budget constraint can be further expressed as 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2 2




b wL a rK
K
wL wL wL rK rK rK K




   




      (3.55) 
The model’s dynamic behavior is fully described by a bivariate system consisting 
of (3.51) and (3.55). 
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3.3.3 Equilibrium Dynamics and Analysis 
  For degenerate growth, we assume that 1(1 ) ( ) K K KK K rK r Kφ φ φρ δ φ ψ − −+ − −  = 0 
holds in (3.51) in the long run. In the steady state, consistency requires that r r= , 
w w= , K K=  and L L= .Using these conditions, the steady state relative price of 
consumption pe can then be uniquely determined by setting 0
.
λ =  in (3.23) to 
obtain 
  ( ) (1 )
e
K K




                 (3.56) 
Similarly, by setting 0
.
K =  in (3.55) and using the consistency conditions, the 




( (1 )) ( )












+ ∆ − + ∆
             (3.57) 
 To study the local stability properties, I approximate the model’s behavior by 
linearization. Since λ is the only non-predetermined variable in the dynamic 
system, the equilibrium path is locally indeterminate when both eigenvalues of the 
Jacobian matrix J have negative real parts, which is equivalent to the condition 
that ( ) 0 ( )Trace J Det J< < . When ( ) 0Det J <  instead, the economy is saddle-path 
stable since there is one eigenvalue with negative real part and another with 
positive real part. The determinant of the Jacobian is found to be16 
  ( )1 2( )Det J η
Σ
= − Ω − Ω                  (3.58) 
                                                 
16
 See Appendix B3. 
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where 
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
1 2 1
( ) (1 )( (1 ))1 1
( ) ( (1 ))
a b b a a b a b
b
θ ρ δ θ ρ δ δ
η θ θ ρ δ
+ + − + + −
= +
Σ − ∆ + −
 
( )
( ) ( )( )( )( ) ( )( )11 21 2 1 1 1K K K KK a
θ ρ δ φ ψ ρ δ φ ψ δ
θ θ ψ
+
Ω = + ∆ − − + + − ∆
∆ −
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )







1 1 1 1 1
1 1
         
1 1
                                                                                        
1








θ φ ψ ψ ρ δ φ ψ δφ ρ δ
θ θ ψ φ ψ
θ φ ψ ρ δ
θ θ φ ψ
Ω

− ∆ − − − + ∆ − + + − ∆
= +
 ∆ − − ∆ − −







and the trace to be 
( ) ( )


















ρ φ ψ δ θ φ ρ δ
φ ψ η θ θ
Σ +
= − Θ − Θ − Θ
∆
+ ∆ − − + + ∆ Σ − +
− +
∆ − −
    (3.59) 
where
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
2 2 1 2 1 2 1
1
2 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
L K K K
L K K K
a b b b
a b b
ρ δ θ ψ θ ψ θ φ ψ δ
θ θ ρ δ ψ ψ φ ψ δ
+ − ∆ − + ∆ − − + − − ∆
Θ =
− ∆ + − − − − − − ∆
 
( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2
2
2 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
K K K L L
L K K K
a
a b b
θ ψ ρ δ φ ψ δ φ ψ
θ θ ρ δ ψ ψ φ ψ δ
− ∆ + ∆ − + + − ∆ − −
Θ =
− ∆ + − − − − − − ∆
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
1 2
3
1 2 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
L K K
L K K K
b
a b b
θ ρ δ ψ φ ψ
θ θ ρ δ ψ ψ φ ψ δ
∆ + − ∆ − − −
Θ =
− ∆ + − − − − − − ∆
 
To facilitate the analysis, the following assumptions are made: 
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ASSUMPTION 3.1  The consumption good is labor intensive from the social 
perspective but capital intensive from the private perspective, i.e. 1 2θ θ<  and 
0∆ > . 
ASSUMPTION 3.2  2 1 1
2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
( ) ( (1 ))0, ( ) (1 )( (1 ))
b
a b b a a b a b
θ θ ρ δη
θ ρ δ θ ρ δ δ
 − ∆ + −
∈  	
+ + − + + −
 
. 
As a starting point in our analysis, let us first consider the following proposition. 
PROPOSITION 3.1  Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2, the indeterminacy of 
equilibrium path results in the absence of labor and capital income taxes, i.e. 
1L Lψ ψ= =  and 0L Kφ φ= = . 
Proof.  In the absence of labor and capital taxes, ( )Det J  and ( )Trace J are found 
to be  
  
( )1 2 1 2 2 1
1 2
( ) (1 )( ) ( )
a a b a b
Det J
θ ρ δ ρ δ δ
η θ θ





( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( ) ( )1 2 2 1 2 1
2
1 22 1 1
( ) 1( ) ( )( ) 1
a b a a
Trace J
b
ρ δ ρ δ θ δ ρ δ δ θ ρ δ
η θ θθ θ ρ δ
Σ + + + − ∆ + + ∆ Σ +
= − − +
∆ −− ∆ + −
.  
Assumption 3.2 implies that Σ>0 and together with Assumption 3.1, it is clear that 
( ) 0Det J >  and ( ) 0Trace J < .  
 Note that indeterminacy crucially depends on Assumption 3.1 without which 
its necessary condition ( ) 0Det J >  cannot be met. Essentially, the divergence of 
private and social intensities implied by Assumption 3.1 causes the dual 
relationship between the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski effects to be broken. 
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This is also the source of indeterminacy in Benhabib and Nishimura (1998) and 
Mino (2001) as the same production setup has been used.3 Instead, if private and 
social intensities are the same, i.e. 1 2 0θ θ− < and 0∆ < , then ( ) 0Det J <  and 
hence the economy is saddle-path stable. 
 Consider now a flat capital tax schedule 1K Kτ ψ= −  which is derived from 
setting 0Kφ = . Contrasting Guo and Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999), demonstrate 
that progressive taxation of labor income can stabilize the economy against 
sunspot fluctuations even when the capital tax schedule is flat, it is found that: 
PROPOSITION 3.2  Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 and given a flat capital tax 
schedule, labor tax policies at all degrees of progressivity are ineffective in 
stabilizing the economy. 
 Proof.   Under Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 and 0Kφ = , the necessary and sufficient 
condition for saddle-path stability is ruled out since  
  









θ ρ δ ρ ψ δ
η θ θ ψ




 To complete the analysis of the model’s dynamic property, the sign of 
( )Trace J  is examined numerically. I choose the benchmark values in the 
production side to be θ1 = 0.3, θ2 = 0.31, a1 = 0.3, a2 = 0.29, b1 = 0.68, and b2 = 
0.69 so that only mild externalities occur for labor input in the consumption sector 
and capital input in the investment sector. In addition, I set δ = 0.1, ρ = 0.065 in 
line with Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Σ =0.05 so that Assumption 3.2 is 
                                                 
3
 Refer to these papers for detailed discussions on indeterminacy arising within this class of models. 
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satisfied. Following Guo (1999), it is assumed ψL=0.77 and ψK=0.5 in order to 
match the U.S. average labor income tax rate of 23% and average capital income 
tax rate of 50%. With these benchmark values, I find that 
[ )exp(3) , exp(3)( ) 2.2496 2.2391Trace J − −∈  for [ )0,1Lφ ∈ , which together with  
( ) 0Det J >  implies that the steady state given a flat capital tax schedule is 
indeterminate (i.e. a sink).  
 Now, keeping the benchmark values for the other parameters and varying the 
progressivity of both labor and capital income tax schedules, i.e. φL and φK,  I find 
that [ )exp(4) , ( ) 2.3174Det J ∞∈ , where the lower bound of ( )Det J  corresponds to 
( ) ( ), 1,0L Kφ φ = , and ( )Det J  approaches ∞  as Kφ  approaches 1 for every Lφ . 
Therefore, under the assumptions made, we postulate that: 
COROLLARY 3.3  With respect to stabilizing this economy, tax policies are 




 To date, previous works on stabilization policy and indeterminacy, Guo and 
Lansing (1998) and Guo (1999), are based on the one-sector Benhabib and Farmer 
(1994) framework where an upward sloping labor demand schedule exists due to 
sufficiently large increasing returns to scale. I have shown that taxation is also 
effective in a two-sector model with increasing returns where externalities are 
mild and labor demand schedule has the usual slope. This conclusion however, 
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cannot be extended to the case where indeterminacy arises with CRS social 
technology. In this respect, since recent empirical estimates strongly suggest that 
social technology exhibits constant returns to scale, it is therefore plausible in 
reality that the government is unable to stabilize the economy against sunspot 
fluctuations through taxation than is otherwise believed to be so previously. 
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APPENDIX A 
A1. THE JACOBIAN MATRICES. 
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∆
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ξ ηξ λλ ηλ
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λ λ= −  
and 
1
'( ) '( )'( ) '( ) 1( 1)( )C CI I b w p L a r p Ka r p K b w p L p ηλ
η
−





'( ) '( ) * ( 1)( )w p L r p K m pξ ηλ
η
−
Γ = + + −  
 
A2. PROOF OF LEMMA 1. 
For expositional purpose, let us make use of the time subscript. Given 0K and *0K , 
the initial price level 0p  can be determined from (2.46) after 0λ and *0λ  are chosen. 
Since the interest rate is implicitly defined by the relative price of consumption, 
we have the expressions ( )0 0r r p= and ( )* *0 0r r p= . After 0p , 0r  and *0r  are 
determined, we can introduce a variable ξ  that solves 
  
*
0 0r rξ=                      (a.1) 
Next, since tp is implicitly defined by tK , *tK , tλ and *tλ , its growth path will 
be affected by the evolution of tK , *tK , tλ and *tλ . In turn, the growth path of 
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tr and *tr will depend on the evolution of tp . First, to find the relationship between 
the instantaneous growth rates of tr and tp , note from (2.19) that 
  
t t I







   
The above expression can be approximated as 
  
1 1t tI
t I C t
dr dp
dt r dt p
θ
θ θ
        





















  for all t∈[0,∞)                  (a.2) 
where 
,r tg and ,p tg are the instantaneous growth rate of tr and tP  at time t. 
Similarly, since r'( ) r*'( )( ) * ( )
p p p p
r p r p
= , we also have 
  *, ,
I









  for all t∈[0,∞)                  (a.3) 
where *,r tg  is the instantaneous growth rate of *tr . At the instant from t=0, the 
movement of tK , *tK , tλ and *tλ  along the equilibrium path towards the steady 
state causes the relative price to grow instantaneously by 
,0Pg . Using (a.2) and 
(a.3), this in turn determines 
,0rg  and *,0rg . For an infinitesimally small amount of 
time, say dt, from t=0, the interest rates are 
  ( ),0 01dt rr g r= +  
  ( )* **,0 01dt rr g r= +  
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Since 
,0 *,0r rg g= , there is a positive real number ξ  that solves 
  
*
dt dtr rξ=  




























, *,r t r tg g= holds for all t∈[0,∞), we have , *,r t r tγ γ=  and hence *t tr rξ=  for 
all t ∈[0,∞). Furthermore, since t  is arbitrary, by setting t t= , therefore *t tr rξ=  
holds for all t∈[0,∞).  
 
A3.  PROOF OF ( 3) 0( 3)
Det JF
Trace J
− + > , PROPOSITION 2.1. 
The proof of F− + ( 3)( 3)
Det J
Trace J
> 0 given ( 3) 0Trace J < , I Cθ θ− <0 and ∆ <0 is 
presented here.  
First, express F− + ( 3)( 3)
Det J
Trace J
 as − 1( 3)Trace J ( )( 3) ( 3)F Trace J Det J− , extract the 
determinant term from ( )F Trace J and use it to cancel the determinant contained 





 is greater 
than zero if and only if ( 3) ( 3)F Trace J Det J− >0. We let  
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X = *2 *11 22 21 12 **          
dp dp
a a a a
dK dK
ρ ρ ρ− = + Λ + Γ   
Y = * 1/22 33 23 32 *'( ) '( ) ( )        
dp P dp
a a a a r p r p m P
d dK
ξ ηξρ λ λ λλ ηλ
−
− = − +   
Z = * 1/11 33 31 13 '( ) '( ) ( )     
dp P dp
a a a a r p r p P
d dK
ηρ λ λ λλ ηλ
−
− = − +  






*                                    
    '( ) '( ) ( )        




r p r p m P
d dK
dp P dp





ξρ λ λ λλ ηλ
ρ λ λ λλ ηλ
−
−










( 3) ( )( ( 3))
( ( 3))( ) '( )
( ( 3))( '( ) ) '( ) '( ) ( )  
'( ) ( )
F Trace J X Y Z Trace J
dp dp dpTrace J X r p Y Y
dK ddK
dp dp dp dp P dpTrace J r p r p r p P

























The second line comes from expanding the trace in ( ( 3)Trace J )(Y) and the third 
and last line comes from expanding both the ( 3)Trace J  and Z  in ( ( 3)Trace J )(Z). 







( ( 3))( ) '( )
( ( 3))( * '( ) ) '( ) '( ) ( )  
'( ) ( )
dp dp dpTrace J X r p Y
dK ddK
dp dp dp dp p dpTrace J r p r p r p p
d dK d dKdK
























where ( )* 1/'( ) / ( ) /Y r p p p dp dKηρ λ ηλ λ −+  is just the determinant.  Therefore, we 






( 3) ( 3)
( ( 3))( - '( ) )
- '( )
'( ) '( ) ( )  
F Trace J Det J





dp dp dp P dp
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- '( ) 0dp dp dpr p
dK ddK
ρ λ λ




Hence, we can express the first line of ( 3) ( 3)F Trace J Det J−  as  
( )* *
*
( ( 3)) - '( ) ( 3) * - '( )dp dp dp dpTrace J X r p p Trace J r p
d dK ddK
ρ λ ρ λλ λ
   





Therefore, ( ( 3))( - * '( ) / ) 0Trace J X r p dp dρ λ λ > . 
In addition, since Y<0 it is clear that the second line of ( 3) ( 3)F Trace J Det J−  
is positive. Moreover, since * '( ) / 0r p dp dKρ λ <  and r'(p)<0, the third line 
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of ( 3) ( 3)F Trace J Det J− is positive term. Therefore, ( 3) ( 3) 0F Trace J Det J− > . 
 
 
A4. PROOF OF ( 3) 0( 3)
Det JF
Trace J
− + > , PROPOSITION 2.2.  
We prove that F− + ( 3)( 3)
Det J
Trace J
> 0 if * 1/ 1/
*
( ) ( ) 0dp dpp m p
p d dK
η ξ ηληρ λ ξ λλ
− −
 




given ( 3) 0Trace J < , I Cθ θ− < 0, and ∆ > 0. By expanding Y in (a.4) and 
rearranging, we write ( ) ( )F Trace J Det J−  as 
*
* * 1/ 1/
* *
( 3) ( 3)
( ( 3))( - '( ) )
'( )
- '( ) ( ) ( )
F Trace J Det J
dpTrace J X r p
d
dp dp dp pr p dp dp
r p p m p
dK d p ddK dK
η ξ η
ρ λ λ




   







Both terms in the second and third lines are positive. Since r'(p)<0 and 
( )* */ / '( ) /dp dK dp dK r p dp dρ λ λΛ + + Γ − 0< , the last line is positive if 
( )( )1/ 1/ ** / / ( ) ( ) /p dp d p m p dp dKη ξ ηρ λη λ λ ξ λ− −− + + 0> , which implies that  
( 3) ( 3) 0F Trace J Det J− >  .Hence equivalently, F− + ( 3)( 3)
Det J
Trace J
>0  if 




B1. DERIVATION OF (3.20) AND (3.21). 
Given a+b=1, we have 
  
a bC AL Kµ=                     (b.1) 
which can also be expressed as 
  
a b CL K
Aµ
=                     (b.2) 





   by using (b.2)















  ,   3. by using ( 14)bS=
Λ
                 (b.3) 





                     (b.4) 
Using these expressions, Equation (3.16) can be represented by 
  
( ) ( )1 1 1 1
1 1
1.
L KL L K K
L K
L KwL a S rK b S
K K




− − − −
− −
= + − −
ΛΛ Λ
  
from which Equation (3.20) is obtained by dividing throughout by K. Equation 
(3.21) can be derived by working through the following steps: 
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( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1
   1 ,   3.
   1 ,   
 by using ( 14)





















ρ δ φ ψ
ρ δ φ ψ
ρ δ φ ψ
 














( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1
   1 ,     
1
   ,    b.3
since

























= + Λ −
Λ
 
and dividing the last expression by Λ.  
 
B2. DERIVATION OF (3.26) AND (3.27). 
Using Equation (b.4), we can write (3.15) as 
  ( )( )
1
11 11 L L L LL LL wL a S
φ χφ φ φψ φ +− − = − Λ 	

 
              (b.5) 




, we obtain  
  ( )1 L K Sθ α βµ− Λ =                    (b.6)  










θ θβ χ χ
−
+ + −
+ +Φ Λ = −                (b.7) 
where Φ  is a constant term. Rewriting Equation (b.7) as 
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( ) ( )1log 1 1 11 1 L sLk s e
θα φαφβ λ θ
χ χ
 − Φ + + + = + − − 	 	  	+ +
  
 
         (b.8) 
where logλ = Λ , logk K=  and logs S= . Therefore, as long as 












+ − + −
+
−
0≠ , we can apply the implicit function 
theorem .Equation (b.8) and obtain an expression s(λ, k). Furthermore, by totally 
differentiating (b.8), we can derive (3.26) and (3.27).  
 
B3. DERIVATION OF  (3.58) AND (3.59). 
First, p is implicitly defined by K and λ and their relationships can be derived by 
totally differentiating (3.54):  
  
1
1( )( )a pdp
dK
ηρ δ λΣ +
= −
∆





= −                    (b.10)  
where 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 1
1 2 1
( ) (1 )( (1 ))1 1
( ) ( (1 ))
a b b a a b a b
b
θ ρ δ θ ρ δ δ
η θ θ ρ δ
+ + − + + −
= +
Σ − ∆ + −
. Linearization 

















λ λ= −  
where  
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  ( )( ) ( )( )2 2' ' 1 1 ' 1 1 'L L K Kb w L a r KA w L r Kφ ψ φ ψ−= − − − − − −∆  
  
( )( )( )2 1 1 K Ka r
B




  ( )21 'K KD rφ ψ= −  
 ( )1K K K rE Kφ φ ψ= −  
By using (b.10), we can express the determinant as ( )1 2( ) /Det J η= −Σ Ω − Ω , 
where 1 * *p B DΩ = and 2 * *p A EΩ = .  
Now, * *p B D  can be expressed as a term of exogenous parameters through the 
following: 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )
( )











= 1   , 
1
3. 3.
= 1 1 1













φ ψ δφ ψ
φ ψ δθ ρ δ φ ψ
θ θ φ ψ
θ ρ δ φ ψ ρ δ φ ψ δ
θ θ ψ






 + ∆ − − + ∆   +  	





+ ∆ − − + + − ∆ = Ω
∆ −
 





( )( ) ( )( )
( )
2 2
 * *  
' '
= 1
1 1 ' 1 1 '
K K K
L L K K
p A E
b pw L a pr K
r
K
pw L pr K
φ φ ψ
φ ψ φ ψ
− 















2 1 2 1
1 2
1 1
1 2 1 2
1
= 1 ,   
1 1 1 1 1
 3. 3.   by using  ( 42) and ( 43)
K K K
L L K K







φ ψ θ φ ψ θ
















( ) ( )( )( )
( )
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( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )






1 1 1 1 1
= 
1 1
         
1 1
                                                                                 ,
1
by using








θ φ ψ ψ ρ δ φ ψ δφ ρ δ
θ θ ψ φ ψ
θ φ ψ ρ δ
θ θ φ ψ

− ∆ − − − + ∆ − + + − ∆
+
 ∆ − − ∆ − −








3. 3. ( 56), ( 57) and rearranging  
= Ω
 
Next, focus on deriving the trace given by (3.59). The only term in this expression 
that requires further attention is /Adp dK  since similar techniques also apply to 
deriving the other terms. First, write /Adp dK  as: 
( )( ) ( )( )





' ' ( )( )
 = 1 1 ' 1 1 '
1 1 ' 1 1 '' ' ( )
          = 
( ) ( ) ( )
L L K K
L L K K
b w L a r K a pdpA w L r K
dK




ρ δ λφ ψ φ ψ





− Σ + 





− − − − 	
− Σ + 
− − − 	 	∆
  	∆ −
 
 









ψ ρ δ φ ψ δ
ψ ρ δ
+ ∆ − + + − ∆
=
− ∆ − +
, to be used later is 
derived from (3.56) and (3.57).   
Next, through the following computation, ( )( ) 1/1 1 ' /( )K K r K p ηφ ψ λ −− − can be 






































− − ∆ 
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−  	 
 





( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }
1 2
1 2 1 1 1
3
1 1 1
=   , 
1 1 1 1
                               
= 
by using and rearranging
L K K





θ ρ δ ψ φ ψ
θ θ ρ δ ψ ψ φ ψ δ
∆ + − ∆ − − −
− ∆ + − − − − − − ∆
Θ
 
Using the same steps, 1Θ  can be derived from  ( ) 1/2 2' ' / ( )b w L a r K p ηλ −− ∆ and 2Θ  
from  ( )( ) 1/1 1 ' /( )L L w L p ηφ ψ λ −− − .  
Finally, (3.59) can then be obtained after rewriting B and /Ddp dλ λ− : 
  









ρ φ ψ δ
φ ψ










3. 3.,   by using  ( 42) and ( 56)KdpD
d










Basu, S. and G. Fernald (1997) “Returns to scale in the US production: estimates 
and implications”, Journal of Political Economy 105, 249–283. 
 
Benhabib, J. and R.E.A. Farmer (1994) “Indeterminacy and increasing returns”, 
Journal of Economic Theory 63, 19–41. 
 
Benhabib, J. and R.E.A. Farmer (1996) “Indeterminacy and sector-specific 
externalities,” Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 421–443. 
 
Benhabib, J. and K. Nishimura (1998) “Indeterminacy and sunspots with constant 
returns”, Journal of Economic Theory 81, 58–96. 
 
Benhabib, J. and R.E.A. Farmer (1999) “Indeterminacy and sunspots in 
macroeconomics, in Handbook of Macroeconomics J. B. Taylor and M. Woodford 
(Eds.) Vol. 1A, North-Holland, New York, 387–448. 
 
Benhabib, J., Q. Meng and K. Nishimura (2000) “Indeterminacy under constant 
returns to scale in multisector economies”, Econometrica 68, 1541–1548. 
 
Bennett, R. and R.E.A. Farmer (2000) “Indeterminacy with non-separable utility”, 
Journal of Economic Theory 93, 118-143. 
 
Boldrin, M. and A. Rustichini (1994) “Growth and indeterminacy in dynamic 
models with externalities”, Econometrica 62, 323–342. 
 
Burnside, C. (1996) “Production function regressions, returns to scale, and 
externalities”, Journal of Monetary Economics 37, 177–201. 
 
Caballero, R.J. and R.K. Lyons (1992) “External effects in US cyclical 
productivity”, Journal of Monetary Economics 29, 209-226. 
 
Devereux, M.B., A.C. Head, A.C. and B.J. Lapham (1996) “Monopolistic 
competition, increasing returns, and the effects of government spending”, Journal 
of Money, Credit, and Banking 28, 233–354. 
 
Fernandes, E., A. Novales, and J. Ruiz (2003) “Indeterminacy under non-
separability of public consumption and leisure in the utility function” Economic 
Modelling, forthcoming. 
 
Gali, J. (1996) “Multiple equilibria in a growth model with monopolistic 
competition”, Economic Theory 8, 251–266. 
 
 89 
Guo, J. and K. Lansing (1998) “Indeterminacy and stabilization policy”, Journal 
of Economic Theory 82, 481–490. 
 
Guo, J. (1999) “Multiple equilibria and progressive taxation of labor income”, 
Economics Letters 65 (1), 97–103. 
 
Hall, R.E. (1988) “The relation between price and marginal cost in U.S. industry”, 
Journal of Political Economy 96, 921–947. 
 
Hall, R.E. (1990) “Invariance properties of Solow’s productivity residual” in 
Growth, Productivity, Unemployment P. Diamond (Ed.), MIT Press, Cambridge 
MA, 71 – 112. 
 
Harrison, S. (2001) “Indeterminacy in a model with sector-specific externalities”, 
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 25, 747–764. 
 
Harrison, S. and M. Weder (2001) “Tracing externalities as sources of 
indeterminacy”, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 26, 851–867. 
 
Herrendorf, B. and À. Valentinyi,. (2002) “On the stability of the two-sector 
Neoclassical growth model with externalities”, unpublished manuscript, 
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, and CEPR. 
 
Kim, J. (2002) “Indeterminacy under constant returns and costs of adjusting 
capital”, unpublished manuscript, University of Virginia. 
 
Meng, Q. and A. Velasco (2003) “Indeterminacy in a small-open economy with 
endogenous labor supply”, Economic Theory 22, 661-669. 
 
Mino, K. (2001) “Indeterminacy and endogenous growth with social constant 
returns”, Journal of Economic Theory 97, 203–222. 
 
Morrison, C. (1990) “Market power, economic profitability and productivity 
growth measurement: An integrated structural approach”, NBER working paper 
no. 3355. 
 
Nishimura, K. and K. Shimomura (2002a) “Trade and indeterminacy in a dynamic 
general equilibrium model”, Journal of Economic Theory 105, 244–260. 
 
Nishimura, K. and K. Shimomura (2002b) “Indeterminacy in a dynamic small 
open economy”, Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 27, 271–281. 
 
Raurich, X. (2001) “Indeterminacy and government spending in a two-sector 
model of endogenous growth”, Review of Economic Dynamics 4, 210–229. 
 
 90 
Schmitt-Grohè, S. and M. Uribè (1997) “Balanced-budget rules, distortionary 
taxes, and aggregate instability”, Journal of Political Economy 105, 976–1000. 
 
Slobodyan, S. (2001) “On impossibility of limit cycles in certain two–dimensional 
continuous-time growth models”, Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and 
Econometrics 5, 33–40 
 
Uzawa, H. (1961) “On a two sector model of economic growth II”, Review of 
Economic Studies 30, 105–18. 
 
Weder, M. (2001) “Indeterminacy in a small open Ramsey growth model”, 
Journal of Economic Theory 98, 339–356. 
 
Wen, Y. (1998) “Capital utilization under increasing returns to scale”, Journal of 
Economic Theory 81, 7–36.  
 
